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[Music]

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hey guys how's it going welcome back to

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the channel uh it's good to see

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everybody here in the live chat

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um yeah let's just jump straight into it

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because i'm really excited to speak to

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my guest tonight i've spoke to him once

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before

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but uh yeah it's always a pleasure so

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let's jump straight in with if i can

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find my cursor

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mr ting mcmillan how's it going tim

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what's going on vinnie how are you man

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good to be here good thank you thank you

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so much for coming on yeah i really

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appreciate it man i know you're a busy

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man so yeah uh it's always good to talk

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to you

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i thought we'd jump

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in to something non-ufo related if

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that's okay because a lot of the stuff

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that you've been covering primarily

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recently has been about the war in

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ukraine

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so i think it would be

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you know almost wrong of me not to bring

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it up at some point so i figured i think

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the first thing i noticed when it was

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started being when it started basically

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and it was reported in mainstream media

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i very quickly saw things on twitter

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that kind of contradict you know those

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contradictions all over the place and

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soon learned that it was better to start

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following the kind of threads that you

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were putting out with people like graham

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rendell chiming in and you know with

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with the knowledge in that so

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i don't really know what the question is

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i guess it's like

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does that worry you that the mainstream

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media put out such sketchy information

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no i mean here's the thing you know and

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one of the things that one of the

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reasons that i've been covering it uh so

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extensively a couple of reasons one

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obviously the defense national security

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beat has always been my beat you know i

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kind of fell into ufos because frankly

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ufos fell into national security in the

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last couple years

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although arguably i guess they've always

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been there and so this was my beat but

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addition to that uh you know

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eastern europe and particularly russia

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has always been an area focused of mine

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uh for writings that i've done for the

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examiner for a lot of stuff that i've

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done when it comes to defense is

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actually focused more on europe focus

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more on on russia in particular and

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vladimir putin and so

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this was

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kind of my area there and you know

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there's a couple of things when it comes

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to trying to cover a war and so you know

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not to

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there's obviously like you said there's

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a lot of chaotic information that comes

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out but but that's really a filter of

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there's

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absolute chaos on the ground especially

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in those early days of the war you know

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both sides nobody knows what's going on

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and yet there's this sensational

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appetite by the public to know what's

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going on and so you get this rapid fire

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pace of information coming

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and we live in a day and age where that

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information you know it was surreal at

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times especially very early into this

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conflict i was able to watch

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live in real time

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live webcams that were up at different

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places i could watch battles as they

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went on live i mean

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unprecedented

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and so you have this ability there where

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you've got this information that's

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coming so fast but you're also seeing it

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you know we always think it's the truth

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on social media but at the same time

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it's under a lens there so it's always

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just we don't know what's going on

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behind the camera you don't know what's

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on going on in the periphery

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but there's this insatiable need to

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share information quick and i think uh

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you know for a lot of news outlets

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uh the same would be going on for you

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know the war in syria or the middle east

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where my expertise isn't or if there was

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something going on in the pacific

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uh you know most news organizations are

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jacks of all trades though they have

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good bureau beat people

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but they're just trying to cover as much

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as they can as well as they can

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yet competing with that rapid fire i've

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got to get info out right now right now

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it's a it's definitely a pardon the pun

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i know for a lot of the ufo crop it's an

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alien feeling because if there's anybody

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accustomed to being patient and waiting

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months years decades for information

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it's the ufo crop and so it is a

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different pace but but uh that's that's

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primarily why you've seen a lot of

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interesting info along with purposeful

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misinformed sprinkled in there

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yeah and do you think this initially was

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planned to be a kind of quick invasion

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quick takeover

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and because now you know we're hearing

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things that it could go on potentially

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for a year or longer i mean

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it doesn't seem to have gone to plan by

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any means

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yeah no i mean absolutely i think if you

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look at how uh the russian military went

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into ukraine they really launched a

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pretty audacious plan

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uh which was

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multiple accesses so they're coming from

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multiple directions with the primary

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objective being the seizure of the

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capital city of kiev to

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force a regime change so unseat uh

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president zielinski and the the duly

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elected leaders that are there so they

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could get a favorable government to

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their interest

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um that's a

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it's a really bold plan

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and it's one that requires extensive

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uh planning it can start requiring

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well-trained troops and you really have

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to have so many pieces i think there's

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times in which people have seen

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uh conflicts like uh you know probably

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the only thing comparable would be the

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u.s invasion uh in iraq

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and you see that and relatively the

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united states went in there uh and it

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was over in in roughly about three days

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you know you had in the insurgency that

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came afterwards and this is how it

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lingered for years but this conflict of

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toppling the power and taking over

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country happened quickly but that's not

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easy and it takes you a really massive

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combined arms warfare strategy where

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you're combining all these pieces it's

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not easy to do and frankly

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russia has not even attempted something

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of this scale since world war ii and so

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they don't have the experience they

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actually didn't really engage in

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well-combined arms warfare in world war

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ii it was more of just a blunderbuss of

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just keep punching through

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and so

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you know their initial plan i think

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was based on this rapid seizure of the

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the capital i believe that there was

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some faulty intelligence i think that's

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kind of universally agreed upon uh that

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they didn't expect much resistance

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and you know very very quickly you know

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within the first couple of hours when

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they tried to

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drop about 200 300 paratroopers into the

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hostile airport outside of kiev did they

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suddenly discover oh

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this is not going to be 2014

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uh you know

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literally everyone is fighting us

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all ukrainians have come together

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they're handing out guns so on top of a

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military that was bolstered by uh help

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from the united states and the united

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kingdom you've got ukrainians who are

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willing to fight

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and so now you know they lost the first

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battle of kiev that that plan is over

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they were defeated and

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now they're trying to launch their

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eastern offensive but even that is a

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little bit uh precarious and so

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when you hear that it could last for

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years or more it really depends on

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is russia able to advance right now no i

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mean they're taking very small

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kilometers at a time if anything uh and

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so it really will boil down to can they

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change that tempo

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while engaged in combat which is not

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easy to do

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and then will ukraine have enough combat

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power and ability to turn the table and

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start going on the offensive so we

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hadn't seen that

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so that's where you could see it last

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for years potentially i don't

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think that it will last

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for years uh i think that we will reach

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a point where

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probably within the next month that

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russia is really going to peter out and

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expend their ability to do anything on

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the eastern front and then provided

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ukraine has the reserves and the the

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hardware which i think they're getting

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in mass from the west uh they'll be able

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to turn around and start kind of turning

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the tables and maybe pushing russia back

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out of their territory

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yeah i think it seems as well a lot of

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pictures that came out that

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the russian artillery and their

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armaments and equipment seemed so

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old and

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questionable and you know that that's

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why it was funny because you can relate

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it to our uap secret russian technology

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and you think if they've if they can't

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you know

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if they haven't got these basic weapons

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do you think they've got super advanced

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technology

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yep no absolutely i think i said that

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very early on i said okay we can

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put that issue to rest uh the the

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russian federation is not responsible

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for the uap encounters that you know

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any in my opinion and in particular the

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ones the u.s military have been

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countering off the united states coast

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it's just

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to me that's not even something up for

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debate uh

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even if we were to suggest these were

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all misidentifications and they were

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more conventional drones that were

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russian

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um they just demonstrated

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absolutely

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horrible

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isr intelligence surveillance

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reconnaissance ability meaning they

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don't have

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even basic capabilities to get real-time

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isr so they surely do not have anything

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advanced any type of advanced aerospace

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platforms you know

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we have learned that a lot of their

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claims over the last couple years are

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all just that claims their propaganda

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their bluster you know we have not their

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su-57 supposed first stealth fighters

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the first time we'll see them

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this year will be them flying over the

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mayday parade uh may 9th or the victor

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day parade excuse me in moscow they're

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going to be

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doing an air show they're not

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engaged in combat

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and so yeah i mean they just russia has

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never been their military forces have

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00:10:13,990 --> 00:10:12,160
never been heavy on the aerospace side

281
00:10:16,550 --> 00:10:14,000
and uh the idea that they could have

282
00:10:17,590 --> 00:10:16,560
left with the technology was always

283
00:10:20,389 --> 00:10:17,600
um

284
00:10:22,470 --> 00:10:20,399
know very unlikely but now i i think we

285
00:10:23,590 --> 00:10:22,480
could say with just about absolute

286
00:10:24,790 --> 00:10:23,600
certainty

287
00:10:26,550 --> 00:10:24,800
absolutely not

288
00:10:27,910 --> 00:10:26,560
this is not russian technology that

289
00:10:30,310 --> 00:10:27,920
people are saying

290
00:10:31,990 --> 00:10:30,320
excellent excellent well i mean i could

291
00:10:33,990 --> 00:10:32,000
do a whole show talking about ukraine

292
00:10:37,350 --> 00:10:34,000
but uh let's move on to ufos before

293
00:10:38,870 --> 00:10:37,360
everybody kind of switches off now yeah

294
00:10:41,590 --> 00:10:38,880
let's get the gary reed thing out the

295
00:10:43,350 --> 00:10:41,600
way because it has been covered a lot um

296
00:10:45,030 --> 00:10:43,360
i'm not sure how much we can talk about

297
00:10:47,190 --> 00:10:45,040
it but just as a couple of points that i

298
00:10:49,509 --> 00:10:47,200
wanted just to sort of get your

299
00:10:52,310 --> 00:10:49,519
clarification on and is that that the

300
00:10:54,710 --> 00:10:52,320
first part i would say is gary reed

301
00:10:55,910 --> 00:10:54,720
he was ousted now does he sit within the

302
00:10:58,150 --> 00:10:55,920
role still without assigned

303
00:10:59,430 --> 00:10:58,160
responsibilities has someone temporarily

304
00:11:01,190 --> 00:10:59,440
taken over

305
00:11:02,550 --> 00:11:01,200
where where are we at with that part of

306
00:11:05,030 --> 00:11:02,560
it right now

307
00:11:06,710 --> 00:11:05,040
sure yeah he he was he was ousted he was

308
00:11:08,550 --> 00:11:06,720
dismissed from the office of the under

309
00:11:10,550 --> 00:11:08,560
secretary of defense for intelligence

310
00:11:12,389 --> 00:11:10,560
okay and one of the things that's very

311
00:11:14,150 --> 00:11:12,399
important to for people to remember is

312
00:11:16,150 --> 00:11:14,160
that within the department of defense of

313
00:11:19,430 --> 00:11:16,160
the us government as a whole uh you know

314
00:11:21,190 --> 00:11:19,440
the us government uh is the the largest

315
00:11:22,389 --> 00:11:21,200
single if we consider the government as

316
00:11:24,630 --> 00:11:22,399
one entity

317
00:11:26,150 --> 00:11:24,640
it is the largest single employer

318
00:11:29,670 --> 00:11:26,160
of people in the world

319
00:11:32,150 --> 00:11:29,680
and on top of that it also has

320
00:11:33,829 --> 00:11:32,160
it can be more like into a giant

321
00:11:35,590 --> 00:11:33,839
industry where you have let's say the

322
00:11:38,230 --> 00:11:35,600
department of defense over here is one

323
00:11:40,150 --> 00:11:38,240
company you have the you know

324
00:11:42,230 --> 00:11:40,160
fbi over here who's another company that

325
00:11:44,310 --> 00:11:42,240
type of thing and then even within those

326
00:11:46,870 --> 00:11:44,320
companies you've got these sub companies

327
00:11:48,949 --> 00:11:46,880
and so the under secretary of defense is

328
00:11:49,990 --> 00:11:48,959
at the pinnacle of the department of

329
00:11:53,670 --> 00:11:50,000
defense

330
00:11:56,470 --> 00:11:53,680
office he has his undersecretaries they

331
00:11:57,910 --> 00:11:56,480
branch off so this is really you know

332
00:12:00,069 --> 00:11:57,920
the plateau

333
00:12:03,110 --> 00:12:00,079
of where you're you're able to get in a

334
00:12:04,310 --> 00:12:03,120
career in in the defense uh department

335
00:12:06,389 --> 00:12:04,320
of defense

336
00:12:09,110 --> 00:12:06,399
and so and particularly the position

337
00:12:10,389 --> 00:12:09,120
that he was in where he was a director

338
00:12:11,829 --> 00:12:10,399
the only way to

339
00:12:13,030 --> 00:12:11,839
achieve a position higher to that is you

340
00:12:14,949 --> 00:12:13,040
have to be appointed you have to be

341
00:12:17,110 --> 00:12:14,959
nominated by the president so this is as

342
00:12:18,389 --> 00:12:17,120
high as you can get if you're just

343
00:12:20,310 --> 00:12:18,399
somebody who

344
00:12:21,990 --> 00:12:20,320
starts from the ground up theoretically

345
00:12:23,110 --> 00:12:22,000
although they rarely do that

346
00:12:25,110 --> 00:12:23,120
um

347
00:12:27,350 --> 00:12:25,120
and so he was

348
00:12:29,750 --> 00:12:27,360
dismissed withdrawn removed from his

349
00:12:32,470 --> 00:12:29,760
position at the under secretary defense

350
00:12:34,790 --> 00:12:32,480
for intelligence he's he's gone for all

351
00:12:36,069 --> 00:12:34,800
intents and purposes he he is

352
00:12:37,590 --> 00:12:36,079
fired

353
00:12:39,350 --> 00:12:37,600
from the under secretary of defense's

354
00:12:42,949 --> 00:12:39,360
office now

355
00:12:45,430 --> 00:12:42,959
it is uh extremely difficult damn near

356
00:12:47,509 --> 00:12:45,440
impossible to actually fire government

357
00:12:49,670 --> 00:12:47,519
employees like outright firearm that you

358
00:12:51,509 --> 00:12:49,680
think of in the private sector okay

359
00:12:52,710 --> 00:12:51,519
you know if you work at a department

360
00:12:54,870 --> 00:12:52,720
store and they want to fire you they

361
00:12:56,310 --> 00:12:54,880
just fire you you're gone you don't have

362
00:12:57,670 --> 00:12:56,320
a job anymore

363
00:12:59,750 --> 00:12:57,680
that's not the case in the u.s

364
00:13:02,389 --> 00:12:59,760
government it is extremely hard

365
00:13:03,910 --> 00:13:02,399
particularly once you reach senior level

366
00:13:05,910 --> 00:13:03,920
positions like this

367
00:13:07,990 --> 00:13:05,920
and so a lot of times they remove you

368
00:13:10,230 --> 00:13:08,000
which is what happened with with uh gary

369
00:13:12,310 --> 00:13:10,240
reid they removed him from that position

370
00:13:15,190 --> 00:13:12,320
yet they're still getting paid by the

371
00:13:17,509 --> 00:13:15,200
department of defense and they're still

372
00:13:19,509 --> 00:13:17,519
in a limbo they call it flying a desk

373
00:13:22,230 --> 00:13:19,519
for a part of time so

374
00:13:25,030 --> 00:13:22,240
it sounds crazy and you think gosh

375
00:13:28,310 --> 00:13:25,040
why does anybody even try to work hard

376
00:13:29,509 --> 00:13:28,320
because i could get fired but still get

377
00:13:31,110 --> 00:13:29,519
a paycheck

378
00:13:33,430 --> 00:13:31,120
and have an office that i show up to and

379
00:13:35,750 --> 00:13:33,440
do nothing and their employees you know

380
00:13:37,590 --> 00:13:35,760
i can i can think of one right

381
00:13:39,509 --> 00:13:37,600
right now off the top of my head who has

382
00:13:41,910 --> 00:13:39,519
been flying a desk for

383
00:13:43,509 --> 00:13:41,920
nine months now you know they do nothing

384
00:13:44,790 --> 00:13:43,519
they do literally do nothing but they're

385
00:13:46,550 --> 00:13:44,800
separated from what they're doing they

386
00:13:48,870 --> 00:13:46,560
have no responsibilities they're not in

387
00:13:50,949 --> 00:13:48,880
direction of anything and so that

388
00:13:54,629 --> 00:13:50,959
happened with him and then once you're

389
00:13:56,389 --> 00:13:54,639
in this limbo position uh it's usually a

390
00:13:58,389 --> 00:13:56,399
it's the government's way of saying it's

391
00:13:59,509 --> 00:13:58,399
very very hard to fire you we want you

392
00:14:01,269 --> 00:13:59,519
to quit

393
00:14:03,189 --> 00:14:01,279
we want you to resign if you'll just

394
00:14:04,870 --> 00:14:03,199
resign we'll give you a cake and you can

395
00:14:06,790 --> 00:14:04,880
go about your merry way

396
00:14:09,030 --> 00:14:06,800
and uh in this case it doesn't look like

397
00:14:10,949 --> 00:14:09,040
mr reed wanted to do that and so then it

398
00:14:13,030 --> 00:14:10,959
becomes a protracted you know legal

399
00:14:15,509 --> 00:14:13,040
battle with general counsel can we do

400
00:14:16,389 --> 00:14:15,519
this can we do that this type of thing

401
00:14:20,550 --> 00:14:16,399
or

402
00:14:22,629 --> 00:14:20,560
have these separate sub components that

403
00:14:25,189 --> 00:14:22,639
are spread out throughout government you

404
00:14:27,350 --> 00:14:25,199
can have somebody that says

405
00:14:29,670 --> 00:14:27,360
i'll take you you can come work for me

406
00:14:31,910 --> 00:14:29,680
you know i you know and this happens

407
00:14:33,910 --> 00:14:31,920
frequently because it is it's there's a

408
00:14:35,910 --> 00:14:33,920
buddy system the reason that uh gary

409
00:14:37,990 --> 00:14:35,920
reed was in the position he was in was

410
00:14:39,829 --> 00:14:38,000
because uh michael vickers the former

411
00:14:40,870 --> 00:14:39,839
under secretary for intelligence brought

412
00:14:41,750 --> 00:14:40,880
him in

413
00:14:43,030 --> 00:14:41,760
um

414
00:14:45,670 --> 00:14:43,040
and so

415
00:14:48,389 --> 00:14:45,680
uh gary reed was then someone at the

416
00:14:51,750 --> 00:14:48,399
defense intelligence agency said okay

417
00:14:53,670 --> 00:14:51,760
we'll you know you can come over here

418
00:14:55,430 --> 00:14:53,680
and so now he is at the defense

419
00:14:58,470 --> 00:14:55,440
intelligence agency

420
00:15:01,269 --> 00:14:58,480
uh in an advisory position

421
00:15:04,949 --> 00:15:01,279
so so not in charge of anybody not uh

422
00:15:08,790 --> 00:15:04,959
not uh you not making any real decisions

423
00:15:09,910 --> 00:15:08,800
and and offering quote advice

424
00:15:12,310 --> 00:15:09,920
and then

425
00:15:14,230 --> 00:15:12,320
that how long that will remain is always

426
00:15:16,389 --> 00:15:14,240
kind of uh

427
00:15:19,189 --> 00:15:16,399
it's up in the air because these type of

428
00:15:21,269 --> 00:15:19,199
positions often is just another way of

429
00:15:23,269 --> 00:15:21,279
saying somebody's flying a desk i just

430
00:15:25,189 --> 00:15:23,279
don't have a desk in here to put it and

431
00:15:26,710 --> 00:15:25,199
so stick him over here that's where he's

432
00:15:27,430 --> 00:15:26,720
going to go to work that's where he'll

433
00:15:31,189 --> 00:15:27,440
go

434
00:15:32,470 --> 00:15:31,199
there every day

435
00:15:34,310 --> 00:15:32,480
and so right now

436
00:15:37,189 --> 00:15:34,320
to the best of my knowledge last i heard

437
00:15:38,870 --> 00:15:37,199
he is at the defense intelligence agency

438
00:15:41,749 --> 00:15:38,880
so

439
00:15:43,990 --> 00:15:41,759
it is it is a nuanced and widely

440
00:15:46,949 --> 00:15:44,000
confusing kind of process

441
00:15:48,629 --> 00:15:46,959
uh i will say that being ousted or being

442
00:15:50,870 --> 00:15:48,639
kicked out as a director of an

443
00:15:53,990 --> 00:15:50,880
intelligence you know he was

444
00:15:55,990 --> 00:15:54,000
up to you know a month ago he was the

445
00:15:57,430 --> 00:15:56,000
most senior counterintelligence law

446
00:15:59,749 --> 00:15:57,440
enforcement security officer for the

447
00:16:01,990 --> 00:15:59,759
department of defense worldwide

448
00:16:03,509 --> 00:16:02,000
huge very significant position and so

449
00:16:06,470 --> 00:16:03,519
being kicked out of that position or

450
00:16:08,710 --> 00:16:06,480
losing that position is

451
00:16:11,829 --> 00:16:08,720
it's not unprecedented but it rarely

452
00:16:12,710 --> 00:16:11,839
happens and it's uh it's a very dramatic

453
00:16:15,509 --> 00:16:12,720
event

454
00:16:16,949 --> 00:16:15,519
and you have to really screw up for that

455
00:16:19,749 --> 00:16:16,959
to happen

456
00:16:22,949 --> 00:16:19,759
yeah absolutely and then his role was

457
00:16:24,389 --> 00:16:22,959
directly uh responsible for aoi msg as

458
00:16:27,350 --> 00:16:24,399
well wasn't it

459
00:16:28,550 --> 00:16:27,360
he was i i can i can say that for a fact

460
00:16:33,590 --> 00:16:28,560
uh

461
00:16:34,629 --> 00:16:33,600
i was was able to obtain the

462
00:16:36,389 --> 00:16:34,639
um

463
00:16:38,870 --> 00:16:36,399
the official classification sheet which

464
00:16:40,550 --> 00:16:38,880
lists the uh the employees and their

465
00:16:41,509 --> 00:16:40,560
roles and the

466
00:16:44,550 --> 00:16:41,519
uh

467
00:16:46,310 --> 00:16:44,560
where they fall into under the the

468
00:16:49,590 --> 00:16:46,320
different programs and everything and so

469
00:16:51,829 --> 00:16:49,600
he was the uh he was the chief executive

470
00:16:53,430 --> 00:16:51,839
uh so he was the senior person in charge

471
00:16:56,389 --> 00:16:53,440
of that and so it's kind of an

472
00:16:57,910 --> 00:16:56,399
interesting thing there because uh for

473
00:17:01,430 --> 00:16:57,920
me it was very interesting because

474
00:17:03,509 --> 00:17:01,440
that's really the the collection of uap

475
00:17:05,750 --> 00:17:03,519
data and this this is really a

476
00:17:07,750 --> 00:17:05,760
intelligence collection um

477
00:17:08,870 --> 00:17:07,760
program it really shouldn't have fallen

478
00:17:11,750 --> 00:17:08,880
under counter intelligence law

479
00:17:14,150 --> 00:17:11,760
enforcement security so so it's a little

480
00:17:15,350 --> 00:17:14,160
odd that it ever felt under that to

481
00:17:18,470 --> 00:17:15,360
begin with

482
00:17:20,630 --> 00:17:18,480
um but that he indeed was the senior uh

483
00:17:21,990 --> 00:17:20,640
principal executive that was in charge

484
00:17:24,230 --> 00:17:22,000
of it

485
00:17:27,429 --> 00:17:24,240
and do you not think that even even the

486
00:17:29,510 --> 00:17:27,439
program sitting in the os uh oh usdi

487
00:17:30,950 --> 00:17:29,520
in itself is a bit strange because they

488
00:17:32,870 --> 00:17:30,960
surely they can't meet the intent of

489
00:17:34,710 --> 00:17:32,880
congress due to the kind of

490
00:17:36,070 --> 00:17:34,720
not being such an operational group

491
00:17:38,549 --> 00:17:36,080
compared to maybe if it was sitting

492
00:17:40,070 --> 00:17:38,559
under odni and dod collaboration or

493
00:17:42,390 --> 00:17:40,080
something like that

494
00:17:44,470 --> 00:17:42,400
sure yeah it's always been in in odd

495
00:17:46,789 --> 00:17:44,480
place because um

496
00:17:48,390 --> 00:17:46,799
usdi for the most part is really just a

497
00:17:49,590 --> 00:17:48,400
policy and

498
00:17:52,630 --> 00:17:49,600
uh

499
00:17:53,830 --> 00:17:52,640
overseer they oversee all the programs

500
00:17:56,470 --> 00:17:53,840
and everything within the department of

501
00:17:58,310 --> 00:17:56,480
defense and so at the operational level

502
00:17:59,750 --> 00:17:58,320
they don't have those personnel so even

503
00:18:01,669 --> 00:17:59,760
though they were

504
00:18:04,150 --> 00:18:01,679
you know technically the overseers and

505
00:18:05,750 --> 00:18:04,160
still are the overseers of that program

506
00:18:07,590 --> 00:18:05,760
at the operational level that has to be

507
00:18:10,390 --> 00:18:07,600
designated to someone else and they can

508
00:18:12,230 --> 00:18:10,400
hire people in to do that specifically

509
00:18:15,590 --> 00:18:12,240
but the the people at the highest levels

510
00:18:16,950 --> 00:18:15,600
who are in charge there they're not uh

511
00:18:19,029 --> 00:18:16,960
they're really not going to be the

512
00:18:20,710 --> 00:18:19,039
people who are collecting reports

513
00:18:22,390 --> 00:18:20,720
analyzing reports surveying reports

514
00:18:25,669 --> 00:18:22,400
anything like that they're just stamping

515
00:18:27,750 --> 00:18:25,679
off on them and uh they they do have

516
00:18:28,710 --> 00:18:27,760
potentially a critical role in this

517
00:18:31,750 --> 00:18:28,720
because

518
00:18:33,430 --> 00:18:31,760
they can stamp off on how how well or

519
00:18:35,510 --> 00:18:33,440
not well

520
00:18:37,669 --> 00:18:35,520
the program is being handled and so if

521
00:18:39,430 --> 00:18:37,679
you're somebody who who certainly

522
00:18:41,430 --> 00:18:39,440
doesn't think that this is an issue that

523
00:18:43,430 --> 00:18:41,440
needs to be going on the us government

524
00:18:47,350 --> 00:18:43,440
doesn't need to be handled uh you can

525
00:18:49,510 --> 00:18:47,360
quite easily you know stamp off on

526
00:18:51,830 --> 00:18:49,520
nonsense or you know

527
00:18:53,590 --> 00:18:51,840
not definitely make it it's easy to put

528
00:18:55,590 --> 00:18:53,600
it out there and say whether you want a

529
00:18:57,430 --> 00:18:55,600
program to fail or succeed i mean it's

530
00:19:00,230 --> 00:18:57,440
in in a highly bureaucratic highly

531
00:19:02,710 --> 00:19:00,240
political system like the us government

532
00:19:04,230 --> 00:19:02,720
and so uh it's always been relatively

533
00:19:08,470 --> 00:19:04,240
interesting though because they're not

534
00:19:11,990 --> 00:19:08,480
an operational component it would be um

535
00:19:14,470 --> 00:19:12,000
frankly to to be well done uh

536
00:19:15,350 --> 00:19:14,480
would take uh

537
00:19:17,669 --> 00:19:15,360
yeah

538
00:19:20,390 --> 00:19:17,679
almost a and another act of congress you

539
00:19:22,950 --> 00:19:20,400
would need a joint all of government

540
00:19:25,510 --> 00:19:22,960
type approach because that you know we

541
00:19:26,390 --> 00:19:25,520
we've i've discussed this a lot is that

542
00:19:27,909 --> 00:19:26,400
uh

543
00:19:29,830 --> 00:19:27,919
you know the department of defense is

544
00:19:31,909 --> 00:19:29,840
limited into what they can look at and

545
00:19:33,190 --> 00:19:31,919
so you know if something flies over the

546
00:19:34,070 --> 00:19:33,200
the continental united states there's

547
00:19:35,909 --> 00:19:34,080
not really anything the department of

548
00:19:38,150 --> 00:19:35,919
defense can do

549
00:19:39,270 --> 00:19:38,160
you know they're not supposed to uh

550
00:19:41,270 --> 00:19:39,280
investigate

551
00:19:43,190 --> 00:19:41,280
over continental united states not

552
00:19:43,909 --> 00:19:43,200
supposed to investigate u.s citizens and

553
00:19:45,669 --> 00:19:43,919
so

554
00:19:47,430 --> 00:19:45,679
that falls under the fbi or department

555
00:19:49,590 --> 00:19:47,440
of homeland security these are totally

556
00:19:51,830 --> 00:19:49,600
separate branches of government so you

557
00:19:54,230 --> 00:19:51,840
really would need a central kind of

558
00:19:55,110 --> 00:19:54,240
whole of government uh

559
00:19:57,430 --> 00:19:55,120
you know

560
00:19:59,750 --> 00:19:57,440
body that could that had the authority

561
00:20:01,029 --> 00:19:59,760
to investigate all of that

562
00:20:03,029 --> 00:20:01,039
because wasn't that one of the problems

563
00:20:05,029 --> 00:20:03,039
with the uh the original

564
00:20:06,950 --> 00:20:05,039
uap task force is that they just didn't

565
00:20:09,190 --> 00:20:06,960
have you know they were they were

566
00:20:10,789 --> 00:20:09,200
roadblocks left right and center for the

567
00:20:12,630 --> 00:20:10,799
you know almost set up to fail from the

568
00:20:13,590 --> 00:20:12,640
start

569
00:20:17,350 --> 00:20:13,600
sure

570
00:20:18,549 --> 00:20:17,360
yeah well i mean and this is um

571
00:20:20,310 --> 00:20:18,559
the thing that's interesting and i've

572
00:20:21,350 --> 00:20:20,320
always said is i think a lot of people

573
00:20:23,590 --> 00:20:21,360
who

574
00:20:27,909 --> 00:20:23,600
have have come into this maybe

575
00:20:29,590 --> 00:20:27,919
purely uap or ufo enthusiast

576
00:20:31,270 --> 00:20:29,600
have have gotten a crash course in

577
00:20:33,590 --> 00:20:31,280
government bureaucracy

578
00:20:34,549 --> 00:20:33,600
and how the u.s government operates

579
00:20:37,270 --> 00:20:34,559
and so

580
00:20:39,029 --> 00:20:37,280
this is not entirely limited to this

581
00:20:41,029 --> 00:20:39,039
topic by any means i mean this goes on

582
00:20:42,630 --> 00:20:41,039
with intelligence topics defense topics

583
00:20:43,990 --> 00:20:42,640
all across the spectrum people don't

584
00:20:45,990 --> 00:20:44,000
want to share it's an extremely

585
00:20:47,510 --> 00:20:46,000
territorial place

586
00:20:50,549 --> 00:20:47,520
and frankly if it's not something that

587
00:20:53,669 --> 00:20:50,559
particularly interests one or one group

588
00:20:56,230 --> 00:20:53,679
or one agency or one area they they will

589
00:20:58,149 --> 00:20:56,240
either not help stonewall uh the

590
00:21:00,070 --> 00:20:58,159
opposite end of that is when it does

591
00:21:01,669 --> 00:21:00,080
become interesting and then suddenly

592
00:21:02,950 --> 00:21:01,679
another group wants to fight and say

593
00:21:06,070 --> 00:21:02,960
well i'm the you know this is supposed

594
00:21:08,149 --> 00:21:06,080
to be my responsibility um that often

595
00:21:10,549 --> 00:21:08,159
goes on between branches of the

596
00:21:12,789 --> 00:21:10,559
government like the us army and

597
00:21:15,430 --> 00:21:12,799
air force will fight over who has

598
00:21:17,029 --> 00:21:15,440
responsibility for certain things and

599
00:21:19,669 --> 00:21:17,039
that's how we get the apache attack

600
00:21:21,270 --> 00:21:19,679
helicopter and the a10 warthog

601
00:21:23,190 --> 00:21:21,280
because the air force and army couldn't

602
00:21:24,310 --> 00:21:23,200
agree on who provided close air support

603
00:21:25,830 --> 00:21:24,320
so they're like well we'll both just

604
00:21:27,350 --> 00:21:25,840
develop our own stuff

605
00:21:28,710 --> 00:21:27,360
and i mean this

606
00:21:32,230 --> 00:21:28,720
so so you

607
00:21:33,990 --> 00:21:32,240
you end up it was always set up

608
00:21:35,909 --> 00:21:34,000
very difficult i mean it's a difficult

609
00:21:37,430 --> 00:21:35,919
topic already

610
00:21:39,590 --> 00:21:37,440
and it's a difficult and that you would

611
00:21:40,870 --> 00:21:39,600
need all of these different players to

612
00:21:43,270 --> 00:21:40,880
play along

613
00:21:45,350 --> 00:21:43,280
and then you run the risk of all these

614
00:21:47,990 --> 00:21:45,360
players also suddenly saying oh there's

615
00:21:49,990 --> 00:21:48,000
something really to this and instead of

616
00:21:52,470 --> 00:21:50,000
working together as a combined effort

617
00:21:53,990 --> 00:21:52,480
suddenly uh space force starts up their

618
00:21:56,070 --> 00:21:54,000
own thing air force starts with their

619
00:21:57,669 --> 00:21:56,080
own thing you know the dod has their own

620
00:21:59,590 --> 00:21:57,679
thing the army has their own thing and

621
00:22:01,669 --> 00:21:59,600
then everybody's actually competing with

622
00:22:04,070 --> 00:22:01,679
each other instead of working together

623
00:22:06,870 --> 00:22:04,080
and so it's always been extremely

624
00:22:08,470 --> 00:22:06,880
problematic and it unfortunately

625
00:22:10,310 --> 00:22:08,480
um

626
00:22:12,070 --> 00:22:10,320
really

627
00:22:13,669 --> 00:22:12,080
this is indicative of how a lot of

628
00:22:15,190 --> 00:22:13,679
things operate in government and i think

629
00:22:17,270 --> 00:22:15,200
that that's why

630
00:22:19,029 --> 00:22:17,280
for a lot of people that's why a lot of

631
00:22:21,110 --> 00:22:19,039
people have spoken to who were in

632
00:22:22,390 --> 00:22:21,120
government being familiar

633
00:22:24,149 --> 00:22:22,400
with government you know even

634
00:22:25,430 --> 00:22:24,159
tangentially which was always

635
00:22:26,710 --> 00:22:25,440
interesting during the gary reid

636
00:22:28,230 --> 00:22:26,720
investigation

637
00:22:30,310 --> 00:22:28,240
i had connections when i was in law

638
00:22:32,390 --> 00:22:30,320
enforcement to that under secretary of

639
00:22:33,909 --> 00:22:32,400
defense for intelligence

640
00:22:35,909 --> 00:22:33,919
of law enforcement because they were law

641
00:22:37,510 --> 00:22:35,919
enforcement and so

642
00:22:38,710 --> 00:22:37,520
tangentially there was there was

643
00:22:40,549 --> 00:22:38,720
different times that i worked for the

644
00:22:43,510 --> 00:22:40,559
dod on stuff

645
00:22:46,149 --> 00:22:43,520
and so um you know knowing and all this

646
00:22:48,710 --> 00:22:46,159
familiarity of it that's why i think

647
00:22:52,070 --> 00:22:48,720
certain things like how atyp came about

648
00:22:54,870 --> 00:22:52,080
and how louis lozando has described atib

649
00:22:56,870 --> 00:22:54,880
and how it operated um

650
00:22:59,830 --> 00:22:56,880
sort of how you know some people get

651
00:23:02,310 --> 00:22:59,840
interpreted outside of the bounds of of

652
00:23:04,630 --> 00:23:02,320
uh authority or or official approval but

653
00:23:08,070 --> 00:23:04,640
it's not necessarily accurate but

654
00:23:09,990 --> 00:23:08,080
frankly these types of of programs and

655
00:23:11,110 --> 00:23:10,000
how that operates are

656
00:23:13,190 --> 00:23:11,120
in

657
00:23:15,029 --> 00:23:13,200
abundance all across government if

658
00:23:16,710 --> 00:23:15,039
there's anybody you've ever

659
00:23:18,390 --> 00:23:16,720
know that's worked in the pentagon

660
00:23:20,070 --> 00:23:18,400
particularly in intelligence will tell

661
00:23:22,070 --> 00:23:20,080
you that anybody who's done any

662
00:23:23,750 --> 00:23:22,080
operational work will tell you that and

663
00:23:26,390 --> 00:23:23,760
they will tell you that's where the best

664
00:23:28,710 --> 00:23:26,400
work is always performed because that's

665
00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:28,720
the only way you can circumvent a lot of

666
00:23:33,430 --> 00:23:31,520
those bureaucratic roblox

667
00:23:34,789 --> 00:23:33,440
yeah absolutely

668
00:23:36,149 --> 00:23:34,799
so i had a question in my head and it

669
00:23:37,510 --> 00:23:36,159
just jumped out because i saw some

670
00:23:39,350 --> 00:23:37,520
comments there

671
00:23:41,430 --> 00:23:39,360
oh it was about you mentioned a tip

672
00:23:43,590 --> 00:23:41,440
there and of course the the debate rages

673
00:23:45,269 --> 00:23:43,600
on with the differences between orsap

674
00:23:47,990 --> 00:23:45,279
and atip and

675
00:23:50,070 --> 00:23:48,000
where atip sat and what responsibilities

676
00:23:51,430 --> 00:23:50,080
it had and what lou had do you think

677
00:23:52,950 --> 00:23:51,440
it's time that that conversation just

678
00:23:56,310 --> 00:23:52,960
gets put to one side because it's kind

679
00:23:58,390 --> 00:23:56,320
of really not doing anybody any favors

680
00:23:59,190 --> 00:23:58,400
um i well

681
00:24:00,390 --> 00:23:59,200
i

682
00:24:02,390 --> 00:24:00,400
for me

683
00:24:03,590 --> 00:24:02,400
i already have

684
00:24:05,510 --> 00:24:03,600
you know

685
00:24:06,950 --> 00:24:05,520
i can't tell people what they can do and

686
00:24:09,190 --> 00:24:06,960
what they want to argue with and bicker

687
00:24:12,149 --> 00:24:09,200
about on on twitter and facebook or

688
00:24:13,669 --> 00:24:12,159
whatever else um i will say that very

689
00:24:15,510 --> 00:24:13,679
rarely does anybody ever see me engage

690
00:24:18,870 --> 00:24:15,520
in that because i have it it's reached

691
00:24:19,590 --> 00:24:18,880
the point now where i don't know uh what

692
00:24:22,549 --> 00:24:19,600
uh

693
00:24:23,669 --> 00:24:22,559
what can be gained from from

694
00:24:25,430 --> 00:24:23,679
you know

695
00:24:27,669 --> 00:24:25,440
getting any kind of clarity or

696
00:24:28,870 --> 00:24:27,679
understanding of of all sap you know

697
00:24:31,590 --> 00:24:28,880
these things where now we're going on

698
00:24:33,350 --> 00:24:31,600
over a decade oh i don't know

699
00:24:36,470 --> 00:24:33,360
you know that's certainly in my opinion

700
00:24:38,630 --> 00:24:36,480
not going to assist in understanding uh

701
00:24:40,470 --> 00:24:38,640
what's going on today what's going on

702
00:24:42,789 --> 00:24:40,480
the contemporary and it's not going to

703
00:24:45,430 --> 00:24:42,799
help solve uap and it's not going to

704
00:24:48,630 --> 00:24:45,440
help solve the government's effort now

705
00:24:50,549 --> 00:24:48,640
and for me personally uh i think that

706
00:24:52,230 --> 00:24:50,559
the core of the claims that were made by

707
00:24:53,110 --> 00:24:52,240
whether it was people in the offset

708
00:24:55,750 --> 00:24:53,120
program

709
00:24:57,190 --> 00:24:55,760
or louis elizondo were always that there

710
00:25:08,950 --> 00:24:57,200
were

711
00:25:10,310 --> 00:25:08,960
within the context of military

712
00:25:12,310 --> 00:25:10,320
situations

713
00:25:14,870 --> 00:25:12,320
and so that core claim for me has

714
00:25:16,230 --> 00:25:14,880
already been substantiated and proven

715
00:25:18,470 --> 00:25:16,240
based on what we've seen in the

716
00:25:20,470 --> 00:25:18,480
evolution uh in the last three or four

717
00:25:22,230 --> 00:25:20,480
years you know when you're seeing uh

718
00:25:23,830 --> 00:25:22,240
congressional legislation being passed

719
00:25:25,830 --> 00:25:23,840
when you're seeing lawmakers speak about

720
00:25:28,630 --> 00:25:25,840
it publicly when you're seeing that kind

721
00:25:32,070 --> 00:25:28,640
of thing that did that in my opinion

722
00:25:34,230 --> 00:25:32,080
has has established that core claim

723
00:25:36,789 --> 00:25:34,240
is valid and so we can kind of move

724
00:25:38,470 --> 00:25:36,799
forward from there i don't know what i

725
00:25:39,590 --> 00:25:38,480
don't know why

726
00:25:42,310 --> 00:25:39,600
or what

727
00:25:46,950 --> 00:25:42,320
is it hope to be gained by that you know

728
00:25:47,990 --> 00:25:46,960
other than uh maybe ridicule and um

729
00:25:50,870 --> 00:25:48,000
yeah

730
00:25:52,789 --> 00:25:50,880
to that end i would just say that is a

731
00:25:55,590 --> 00:25:52,799
an interesting way to go about an

732
00:25:57,110 --> 00:25:55,600
argument because um

733
00:25:58,630 --> 00:25:57,120
they're mutually exclusive you can

734
00:26:00,630 --> 00:25:58,640
actually you can have people who believe

735
00:26:02,870 --> 00:26:00,640
weird things you can have people who are

736
00:26:04,549 --> 00:26:02,880
crazy uh you know ramadan the

737
00:26:06,230 --> 00:26:04,559
mathematician the famous indian

738
00:26:07,430 --> 00:26:06,240
mathematician belief that a hindu

739
00:26:08,830 --> 00:26:07,440
goddess

740
00:26:11,510 --> 00:26:08,840
taught him

741
00:26:14,310 --> 00:26:11,520
um what we use now the mathematics that

742
00:26:17,269 --> 00:26:14,320
we now use for computers that taught him

743
00:26:20,070 --> 00:26:17,279
uh you know an entirely new branch of

744
00:26:21,669 --> 00:26:20,080
mathematics did he i don't know

745
00:26:23,350 --> 00:26:21,679
but i do know that that is the

746
00:26:25,750 --> 00:26:23,360
mathematics you know modular mathematics

747
00:26:27,510 --> 00:26:25,760
is what we use today we can thank that

748
00:26:29,430 --> 00:26:27,520
in large part to us being able to

749
00:26:30,470 --> 00:26:29,440
communicate right now and use a computer

750
00:26:32,470 --> 00:26:30,480
and so

751
00:26:35,669 --> 00:26:32,480
it is mutually exclusive that people can

752
00:26:37,590 --> 00:26:35,679
have fantastical beliefs you know and

753
00:26:39,830 --> 00:26:37,600
claim to have seen a werewolf or you

754
00:26:41,430 --> 00:26:39,840
know whatever skinwalker ranch maybe

755
00:26:43,590 --> 00:26:41,440
they did maybe they didn't but that's

756
00:26:46,149 --> 00:26:43,600
mutually exclusive from are there these

757
00:26:47,590 --> 00:26:46,159
events going on that pilots or or other

758
00:26:49,190 --> 00:26:47,600
service members or just the average

759
00:26:51,510 --> 00:26:49,200
public are encountering

760
00:26:52,549 --> 00:26:51,520
two different things so i don't know

761
00:26:55,590 --> 00:26:52,559
i don't

762
00:26:57,669 --> 00:26:55,600
what it's kind of the old

763
00:26:59,510 --> 00:26:57,679
uh you know it's it's not even throwing

764
00:27:02,230 --> 00:26:59,520
the baby out with the bath water it's

765
00:27:04,070 --> 00:27:02,240
you're trying to boil the baby while cur

766
00:27:05,669 --> 00:27:04,080
turning the water up

767
00:27:07,190 --> 00:27:05,679
and it's

768
00:27:08,870 --> 00:27:07,200
to no end

769
00:27:10,549 --> 00:27:08,880
yeah that's what it seems like it really

770
00:27:12,390 --> 00:27:10,559
does seem like it's just a

771
00:27:14,310 --> 00:27:12,400
just a recurring groundhog day of

772
00:27:15,750 --> 00:27:14,320
conversation and argument and debate and

773
00:27:18,310 --> 00:27:15,760
it's just

774
00:27:19,669 --> 00:27:18,320
yeah yeah i i agree with everything you

775
00:27:21,909 --> 00:27:19,679
said there yeah

776
00:27:22,710 --> 00:27:21,919
yeah i i don't i don't i truly don't

777
00:27:27,110 --> 00:27:22,720
know

778
00:27:29,590 --> 00:27:27,120
other than i will say that uh in my

779
00:27:31,190 --> 00:27:29,600
experience those kinds of questions even

780
00:27:32,870 --> 00:27:31,200
if people have valid questions there's

781
00:27:35,510 --> 00:27:32,880
nothing wrong with answering them they

782
00:27:37,110 --> 00:27:35,520
aren't answered typically by twitter and

783
00:27:38,950 --> 00:27:37,120
they aren't answered on facebook you

784
00:27:41,750 --> 00:27:38,960
actually have to get out of that kind of

785
00:27:44,950 --> 00:27:41,760
echo chamber and there's

786
00:27:46,710 --> 00:27:44,960
okay i'm an expert of nothing and so um

787
00:27:48,950 --> 00:27:46,720
you know anything that i i've commented

788
00:27:50,230 --> 00:27:48,960
on yeah i don't know i talk to people

789
00:27:52,389 --> 00:27:50,240
who know i talk to people that know in

790
00:27:54,149 --> 00:27:52,399
the system and that even extends beyond

791
00:27:56,070 --> 00:27:54,159
i see this a lot where people say well

792
00:27:58,070 --> 00:27:56,080
lou said this or lou said that or chris

793
00:28:00,149 --> 00:27:58,080
melvin said this is a christmas so that

794
00:28:02,470 --> 00:28:00,159
this type of thing we'll find out how

795
00:28:04,149 --> 00:28:02,480
normal is what they're saying in the

796
00:28:06,070 --> 00:28:04,159
context of the setting that they're

797
00:28:09,269 --> 00:28:06,080
saying it in and that means you know for

798
00:28:11,669 --> 00:28:09,279
me is investigative journalist i don't

799
00:28:13,350 --> 00:28:11,679
you know i don't ask lou or chris if

800
00:28:14,950 --> 00:28:13,360
this is normal because i already know

801
00:28:17,669 --> 00:28:14,960
they're biased you know we already know

802
00:28:19,830 --> 00:28:17,679
what theirs is you ask people who work

803
00:28:21,750 --> 00:28:19,840
in those government systems

804
00:28:24,389 --> 00:28:21,760
what's normal what's not normal and you

805
00:28:26,789 --> 00:28:24,399
can ask those questions outside of uh

806
00:28:28,789 --> 00:28:26,799
outside of ufos you know i saw there was

807
00:28:31,269 --> 00:28:28,799
recently a raging debate about the the

808
00:28:34,789 --> 00:28:31,279
crada and the ttsa thing

809
00:28:39,190 --> 00:28:37,430
why doesn't anybody contact anybody who

810
00:28:40,710 --> 00:28:39,200
works in government contracts or has

811
00:28:42,549 --> 00:28:40,720
worked in government contracts or a

812
00:28:45,430 --> 00:28:42,559
government watchdog there's plenty of

813
00:28:47,110 --> 00:28:45,440
those ngos out there and just ask them

814
00:28:50,149 --> 00:28:47,120
how does kratos work you know how does

815
00:28:52,389 --> 00:28:50,159
this work is this normal i mean

816
00:28:54,710 --> 00:28:52,399
just ask them we don't have to interpret

817
00:28:56,630 --> 00:28:54,720
or debate it but but that's uh i'll get

818
00:28:58,789 --> 00:28:56,640
off my soapbox but to answer your

819
00:29:00,630 --> 00:28:58,799
question there i think um

820
00:29:02,310 --> 00:29:00,640
particularly we seem to beat a lot of

821
00:29:05,669 --> 00:29:02,320
questions to death that we don't even

822
00:29:06,789 --> 00:29:05,679
try to answer at times we just continue

823
00:29:11,110 --> 00:29:06,799
on

824
00:29:12,549 --> 00:29:11,120
have for you was regarding classified

825
00:29:14,310 --> 00:29:12,559
briefings and then

826
00:29:15,830 --> 00:29:14,320
literally within the hour leading up to

827
00:29:18,070 --> 00:29:15,840
me speaking with you we saw a new

828
00:29:20,310 --> 00:29:18,080
article from brian bender in politico

829
00:29:21,510 --> 00:29:20,320
titled the ufo briefings on capitol hill

830
00:29:23,510 --> 00:29:21,520
have begun

831
00:29:25,430 --> 00:29:23,520
lawmakers aren't impressed have you had

832
00:29:27,029 --> 00:29:25,440
time to scan it at all

833
00:29:29,350 --> 00:29:27,039
i haven't you're breaking this news to

834
00:29:30,950 --> 00:29:29,360
me so i have not seen uh i haven't read

835
00:29:33,430 --> 00:29:30,960
the article yet i haven't heard about it

836
00:29:35,269 --> 00:29:33,440
so yeah now i'm curious

837
00:29:36,870 --> 00:29:35,279
it's it's i mean i have i've read it

838
00:29:38,950 --> 00:29:36,880
once but obviously i like to go back and

839
00:29:41,190 --> 00:29:38,960
kind of really sort of uh

840
00:29:42,630 --> 00:29:41,200
take my time to absorb it but the it

841
00:29:44,549 --> 00:29:42,640
does seem like the congress are really

842
00:29:46,230 --> 00:29:44,559
trying to put pressure on now um but

843
00:29:47,909 --> 00:29:46,240
there was one statement which i'm just

844
00:29:50,630 --> 00:29:47,919
gonna find and read out that did

845
00:29:52,149 --> 00:29:50,640
actually stand out to me and

846
00:29:53,590 --> 00:29:52,159
typical are probably not gonna be able

847
00:29:55,029 --> 00:29:53,600
to find it now

848
00:29:56,470 --> 00:29:55,039
ah here it is

849
00:29:58,470 --> 00:29:56,480
it says

850
00:30:00,310 --> 00:29:58,480
quote i have seen everything we have in

851
00:30:02,870 --> 00:30:00,320
the files and i am very confident that

852
00:30:05,269 --> 00:30:02,880
they are not ours said a former senior

853
00:30:07,909 --> 00:30:05,279
intelligence official who had authority

854
00:30:11,669 --> 00:30:07,919
over the ufo portfolio referring to

855
00:30:14,310 --> 00:30:11,679
classified us aircraft programs

856
00:30:15,830 --> 00:30:14,320
it just stood out you know i think uh

857
00:30:17,350 --> 00:30:15,840
sure yeah

858
00:30:19,590 --> 00:30:17,360
that's what i was really curious what

859
00:30:20,710 --> 00:30:19,600
was your um now i'm gonna interview you

860
00:30:21,990 --> 00:30:20,720
vinny

861
00:30:23,510 --> 00:30:22,000
what was your general feel from the

862
00:30:24,549 --> 00:30:23,520
article was it when you said that they

863
00:30:26,230 --> 00:30:24,559
weren't impressed were they not

864
00:30:28,149 --> 00:30:26,240
impressed with the sightings being

865
00:30:30,310 --> 00:30:28,159
presented or the work being done did you

866
00:30:32,070 --> 00:30:30,320
say i think uh i think they kind of

867
00:30:34,149 --> 00:30:32,080
seemed like they were okay with the

868
00:30:36,149 --> 00:30:34,159
collection of everything but then it was

869
00:30:38,149 --> 00:30:36,159
kind of like they really need to deal

870
00:30:40,070 --> 00:30:38,159
with doing something with it now that

871
00:30:43,269 --> 00:30:40,080
kind of was the initial thing i got from

872
00:30:44,950 --> 00:30:43,279
that that first read um it might change

873
00:30:46,070 --> 00:30:44,960
the second time i read it but that was

874
00:30:47,510 --> 00:30:46,080
kind of the first thing that really

875
00:30:49,750 --> 00:30:47,520
stood out

876
00:30:51,590 --> 00:30:49,760
sure well and i said i'll be eager to

877
00:30:52,870 --> 00:30:51,600
look at that because that

878
00:30:54,310 --> 00:30:52,880
that's what i'm curious about what you

879
00:30:56,230 --> 00:30:54,320
mentioned is kind of an interesting

880
00:30:58,310 --> 00:30:56,240
aspect of all of this because

881
00:31:00,630 --> 00:30:58,320
being familiar with

882
00:31:03,590 --> 00:31:00,640
the intelligence collection process

883
00:31:06,389 --> 00:31:03,600
uh this is a slow-moving process and

884
00:31:10,070 --> 00:31:06,399
whereas i know a lot of a lot of people

885
00:31:13,350 --> 00:31:12,149
are really kind of aghast at the idea

886
00:31:14,710 --> 00:31:13,360
that the government could be treating

887
00:31:16,149 --> 00:31:14,720
this as if they're discovering it for

888
00:31:17,190 --> 00:31:16,159
the first time and going through this

889
00:31:18,950 --> 00:31:17,200
process of what's called the

890
00:31:20,950 --> 00:31:18,960
intelligence cycle

891
00:31:22,149 --> 00:31:20,960
for the first time whether that's true

892
00:31:24,149 --> 00:31:22,159
or not i don't know but they're

893
00:31:26,630 --> 00:31:24,159
definitely treating it that way and so

894
00:31:29,110 --> 00:31:26,640
that cycle is a slow-moving process

895
00:31:30,549 --> 00:31:29,120
because it's they're unlike what we see

896
00:31:33,029 --> 00:31:30,559
when we see intelligence whether it's on

897
00:31:34,389 --> 00:31:33,039
ukraine or russia or whatever else these

898
00:31:36,789 --> 00:31:34,399
are programs that have been going on for

899
00:31:39,269 --> 00:31:36,799
decades you know they're well firm this

900
00:31:41,190 --> 00:31:39,279
is as if they're treating it a topic

901
00:31:43,350 --> 00:31:41,200
that they've never dealt with before and

902
00:31:45,669 --> 00:31:43,360
so it's this collection

903
00:31:47,590 --> 00:31:45,679
baseline interpretation of the data

904
00:31:49,750 --> 00:31:47,600
where do we go from here kind of

905
00:31:50,710 --> 00:31:49,760
circular process here

906
00:31:53,029 --> 00:31:50,720
and so

907
00:31:55,029 --> 00:31:53,039
it is interesting because i think um

908
00:31:57,110 --> 00:31:55,039
that's what i'm curious about is you you

909
00:31:58,149 --> 00:31:57,120
reach this part where you've collected

910
00:31:59,350 --> 00:31:58,159
but then

911
00:32:00,950 --> 00:31:59,360
i think the thing that frustrates

912
00:32:02,310 --> 00:32:00,960
probably lawmakers

913
00:32:04,950 --> 00:32:02,320
just based on the sound of what you said

914
00:32:07,430 --> 00:32:04,960
and the rest of us is that first stage

915
00:32:09,430 --> 00:32:07,440
is you've got all this you say well here

916
00:32:11,110 --> 00:32:09,440
it is we know this this and this is real

917
00:32:13,110 --> 00:32:11,120
or this is occurring and then when you

918
00:32:14,870 --> 00:32:13,120
say well what is it and you go i don't

919
00:32:16,149 --> 00:32:14,880
know

920
00:32:19,029 --> 00:32:16,159
that's frustrating i think it's

921
00:32:21,590 --> 00:32:19,039
frustrating for everybody and so it uh

922
00:32:25,110 --> 00:32:21,600
i'm curious to but that's always been

923
00:32:27,029 --> 00:32:25,120
where i have interpreted the process was

924
00:32:28,789 --> 00:32:27,039
yeah yeah a fractal mine here in the

925
00:32:31,430 --> 00:32:28,799
chat raises a good point

926
00:32:33,909 --> 00:32:31,440
and that the law make the lawmakers

927
00:32:35,350 --> 00:32:33,919
aren't impressed

928
00:32:37,110 --> 00:32:35,360
here we go

929
00:32:38,710 --> 00:32:37,120
agencies need to take this issue more

930
00:32:40,149 --> 00:32:38,720
seriously so the lawmakers aren't

931
00:32:42,149 --> 00:32:40,159
impressed that there doesn't seem to be

932
00:32:43,190 --> 00:32:42,159
that sense of urgency and seriousness

933
00:32:47,909 --> 00:32:43,200
from the

934
00:32:51,509 --> 00:32:49,590
you know

935
00:32:53,029 --> 00:32:51,519
sure and that's was the other side i was

936
00:32:55,990 --> 00:32:53,039
just curious about because i can see

937
00:32:59,430 --> 00:32:56,000
that as well wholeheartedly and i think

938
00:33:01,269 --> 00:32:59,440
uh i mean i truly believe that if uh if

939
00:33:03,590 --> 00:33:01,279
they're going to be able to achieve what

940
00:33:04,950 --> 00:33:03,600
lawmakers want uh and what the lawmakers

941
00:33:06,230 --> 00:33:04,960
have requested

942
00:33:07,509 --> 00:33:06,240
and has been signed in law by the

943
00:33:10,389 --> 00:33:07,519
president of the united states so so

944
00:33:11,990 --> 00:33:10,399
they're obligated to provide is going to

945
00:33:15,029 --> 00:33:12,000
require them

946
00:33:16,870 --> 00:33:15,039
to really designate specific people to

947
00:33:18,789 --> 00:33:16,880
handle this task

948
00:33:21,190 --> 00:33:18,799
outside of how i think they have tried

949
00:33:23,509 --> 00:33:21,200
to handle it especially

950
00:33:25,509 --> 00:33:23,519
beginning at the beginning of last year

951
00:33:28,549 --> 00:33:25,519
you know there was some shuffling

952
00:33:32,230 --> 00:33:28,559
uh inside who was handling it the the

953
00:33:35,190 --> 00:33:32,240
people who were handling it from 2017

954
00:33:37,190 --> 00:33:35,200
to 2020 kind of changed hands and so

955
00:33:39,029 --> 00:33:37,200
then there was this hot potato kind of

956
00:33:39,830 --> 00:33:39,039
mix of it but it was handed to people

957
00:33:41,909 --> 00:33:39,840
who

958
00:33:44,149 --> 00:33:41,919
this wasn't their only job designation

959
00:33:46,070 --> 00:33:44,159
and they had other portfolios and other

960
00:33:48,230 --> 00:33:46,080
things going on i think it's going to be

961
00:33:51,190 --> 00:33:48,240
extremely hard to try to investigate

962
00:33:52,870 --> 00:33:51,200
this under that precedent because uh you

963
00:33:54,389 --> 00:33:52,880
know if you're trying to juggle defense

964
00:33:56,070 --> 00:33:54,399
and intelligence things you're you're

965
00:33:57,430 --> 00:33:56,080
always going to have things that are

966
00:33:59,029 --> 00:33:57,440
going on in the world

967
00:34:01,509 --> 00:33:59,039
that are more pressing

968
00:34:04,549 --> 00:34:01,519
and seem more immediate that than your

969
00:34:06,630 --> 00:34:04,559
ap does you know we can and i know that

970
00:34:08,550 --> 00:34:06,640
that frustrates some people and when

971
00:34:10,950 --> 00:34:08,560
when i say that um

972
00:34:12,230 --> 00:34:10,960
but it's the same reason that we open

973
00:34:13,990 --> 00:34:12,240
this conversation i've been covering

974
00:34:16,149 --> 00:34:14,000
ukraine for the last two months it's

975
00:34:18,710 --> 00:34:16,159
very immediate it's a it's an area of

976
00:34:19,990 --> 00:34:18,720
where my my interest and expertise lies

977
00:34:22,310 --> 00:34:20,000
and it's very immediate where there's

978
00:34:23,430 --> 00:34:22,320
lives being lost lives are being changed

979
00:34:25,589 --> 00:34:23,440
uh

980
00:34:26,310 --> 00:34:25,599
the effects of what's going on there you

981
00:34:28,710 --> 00:34:26,320
know

982
00:34:29,829 --> 00:34:28,720
dramatically change people's lives

983
00:34:32,550 --> 00:34:29,839
instantly

984
00:34:34,950 --> 00:34:32,560
uh and permanently whereas uap you could

985
00:34:36,950 --> 00:34:34,960
say man this has been around for decades

986
00:34:38,149 --> 00:34:36,960
they're not attacking us you know maybe

987
00:34:39,349 --> 00:34:38,159
longer

988
00:34:41,190 --> 00:34:39,359
there's always going to be something

989
00:34:43,430 --> 00:34:41,200
that seems to be more immediate and so

990
00:34:45,030 --> 00:34:43,440
is is russia going to nuke us is north

991
00:34:46,470 --> 00:34:45,040
korea going to nuke us

992
00:34:47,990 --> 00:34:46,480
if you're if you're talking to defense

993
00:34:50,149 --> 00:34:48,000
and intelligence people that is always

994
00:34:53,190 --> 00:34:50,159
going to take precedent over

995
00:34:54,230 --> 00:34:53,200
uap i'm not sure i understand but that

996
00:34:55,270 --> 00:34:54,240
is not

997
00:34:58,069 --> 00:34:55,280
what

998
00:34:59,829 --> 00:34:58,079
i don't even know where that came from

999
00:35:04,390 --> 00:34:59,839
but

1000
00:35:06,390 --> 00:35:04,400
i was like what the hell jesus

1001
00:35:08,310 --> 00:35:06,400
the cia is listening to me um

1002
00:35:10,150 --> 00:35:08,320
[Laughter]

1003
00:35:12,230 --> 00:35:10,160
see they're agreeing they're not sure

1004
00:35:14,390 --> 00:35:12,240
they understand uh but that doesn't mean

1005
00:35:16,710 --> 00:35:14,400
that there's a lot of issues that aren't

1006
00:35:18,069 --> 00:35:16,720
as pressing as being is full-on nuclear

1007
00:35:19,750 --> 00:35:18,079
war

1008
00:35:21,349 --> 00:35:19,760
that still need to be handled and still

1009
00:35:23,349 --> 00:35:21,359
need to be discussed they still need to

1010
00:35:25,670 --> 00:35:23,359
be investigated and this is one of them

1011
00:35:27,030 --> 00:35:25,680
and so i think i would wholeheartedly

1012
00:35:28,630 --> 00:35:27,040
agree

1013
00:35:30,550 --> 00:35:28,640
we certainly spend a lot of money on a

1014
00:35:33,430 --> 00:35:30,560
lot of different things

1015
00:35:35,190 --> 00:35:33,440
that are perhaps not nearly as pressing

1016
00:35:37,109 --> 00:35:35,200
so i don't want to take anybody away

1017
00:35:39,670 --> 00:35:37,119
from their national security work let's

1018
00:35:41,349 --> 00:35:39,680
just get some other people to do it

1019
00:35:43,430 --> 00:35:41,359
i think one thing that we noticed last

1020
00:35:46,870 --> 00:35:43,440
year specifically in the lead up to the

1021
00:35:47,990 --> 00:35:46,880
uh uap task force preliminary assessment

1022
00:35:49,190 --> 00:35:48,000
is that the

1023
00:35:50,470 --> 00:35:49,200
there was members

1024
00:35:52,630 --> 00:35:50,480
of people on capitol hill were getting

1025
00:35:54,390 --> 00:35:52,640
briefings and we saw senators and and

1026
00:35:56,710 --> 00:35:54,400
that talking on the steps coming out

1027
00:35:58,150 --> 00:35:56,720
saying yes we've had briefings and even

1028
00:35:59,750 --> 00:35:58,160
though they didn't say anything about

1029
00:36:02,230 --> 00:35:59,760
them just the fact that they were there

1030
00:36:04,630 --> 00:36:02,240
on tv for people to see was a positive

1031
00:36:06,230 --> 00:36:04,640
thing for the community and so what i

1032
00:36:08,230 --> 00:36:06,240
was sort of looking

1033
00:36:09,510 --> 00:36:08,240
looking at was will we see that again

1034
00:36:11,109 --> 00:36:09,520
with the amount of

1035
00:36:12,550 --> 00:36:11,119
apparent classified briefings that are

1036
00:36:14,630 --> 00:36:12,560
due this year

1037
00:36:16,150 --> 00:36:14,640
you know are we likely to see them a

1038
00:36:17,030 --> 00:36:16,160
similar kind of thing because i think it

1039
00:36:18,950 --> 00:36:17,040
does

1040
00:36:20,550 --> 00:36:18,960
it is good to hear from these people on

1041
00:36:21,510 --> 00:36:20,560
tv

1042
00:36:24,790 --> 00:36:21,520
sure

1043
00:36:26,310 --> 00:36:24,800
and i i think it it uh it was nice it

1044
00:36:28,310 --> 00:36:26,320
was very interesting i think a lot of

1045
00:36:29,910 --> 00:36:28,320
the responses were

1046
00:36:32,550 --> 00:36:29,920
you know really interesting especially

1047
00:36:34,550 --> 00:36:32,560
when you saw lawmakers like marco rubio

1048
00:36:35,750 --> 00:36:34,560
and people coming out on tv and

1049
00:36:37,430 --> 00:36:35,760
discussing them you know these are

1050
00:36:38,790 --> 00:36:37,440
people who are very vested in their

1051
00:36:40,550 --> 00:36:38,800
political careers and so if they're

1052
00:36:42,950 --> 00:36:40,560
willing to talk about it publicly

1053
00:36:45,670 --> 00:36:42,960
frankly that only further establishes

1054
00:36:48,150 --> 00:36:45,680
the legitimacy of the topic and so will

1055
00:36:50,550 --> 00:36:48,160
we see that or not again i don't know

1056
00:36:52,069 --> 00:36:50,560
obviously they're very limited uh in

1057
00:36:53,430 --> 00:36:52,079
terms of what they can say you know

1058
00:36:55,510 --> 00:36:53,440
classified

1059
00:36:57,270 --> 00:36:55,520
congress in and of itself and i think

1060
00:36:59,190 --> 00:36:57,280
this is maybe an area where where some

1061
00:37:01,990 --> 00:36:59,200
people have been confused but the

1062
00:37:04,069 --> 00:37:02,000
confidence congress has no authority to

1063
00:37:04,790 --> 00:37:04,079
declassify anything

1064
00:37:07,670 --> 00:37:04,800
so

1065
00:37:09,990 --> 00:37:07,680
they can't even declassify this stuff if

1066
00:37:12,470 --> 00:37:10,000
they wanted to nor can they discuss it

1067
00:37:13,829 --> 00:37:12,480
if it's classified um they just they

1068
00:37:15,670 --> 00:37:13,839
don't have that authority it's it's

1069
00:37:17,510 --> 00:37:15,680
outside of their balance unless they

1070
00:37:19,349 --> 00:37:17,520
themselves want to get in trouble

1071
00:37:21,349 --> 00:37:19,359
however if it's an issue that they know

1072
00:37:23,030 --> 00:37:21,359
is significant to their constituents

1073
00:37:25,349 --> 00:37:23,040
they know that people are asking about

1074
00:37:27,430 --> 00:37:25,359
it they can certainly do

1075
00:37:28,790 --> 00:37:27,440
what we saw last year where there's

1076
00:37:31,589 --> 00:37:28,800
they're acknowledging that we're being

1077
00:37:33,750 --> 00:37:31,599
briefed on it and so i think uh the the

1078
00:37:36,550 --> 00:37:33,760
volume of public responses will come

1079
00:37:38,790 --> 00:37:36,560
from the volume in which people ask

1080
00:37:40,950 --> 00:37:38,800
for public responses including people in

1081
00:37:42,790 --> 00:37:40,960
the media and the public you know hey

1082
00:37:44,150 --> 00:37:42,800
have you been doing what's going on with

1083
00:37:46,150 --> 00:37:44,160
this what's going on with this i think

1084
00:37:48,710 --> 00:37:46,160
that's the only way that you're going to

1085
00:37:50,630 --> 00:37:48,720
get anything out of anybody

1086
00:37:51,910 --> 00:37:50,640
to what extent i don't know but at the

1087
00:37:53,589 --> 00:37:51,920
same time

1088
00:37:55,750 --> 00:37:53,599
we could likely get at least enough that

1089
00:37:57,990 --> 00:37:55,760
we got last year that at least either

1090
00:38:01,190 --> 00:37:58,000
establishes what they're being provided

1091
00:38:02,790 --> 00:38:01,200
continues to this is a legitimate topic

1092
00:38:06,790 --> 00:38:02,800
or you know

1093
00:38:08,870 --> 00:38:06,800
they're going ah this is bs and so um

1094
00:38:11,349 --> 00:38:08,880
be interesting i think we could likely

1095
00:38:13,670 --> 00:38:11,359
see all of that uh i think especially

1096
00:38:15,750 --> 00:38:13,680
now with with bender putting that out in

1097
00:38:17,190 --> 00:38:15,760
the ether um

1098
00:38:18,870 --> 00:38:17,200
certainly i may try to follow up on

1099
00:38:21,670 --> 00:38:18,880
there's certainly a lot of people who

1100
00:38:23,990 --> 00:38:21,680
should follow up on it yeah

1101
00:38:26,230 --> 00:38:24,000
i imagine i imagine they're the guy guys

1102
00:38:28,470 --> 00:38:26,240
at uap media we'll have something else

1103
00:38:30,230 --> 00:38:28,480
soon oh i noticed i i just want to say

1104
00:38:32,470 --> 00:38:30,240
this to everybody in the chat if i've

1105
00:38:35,270 --> 00:38:32,480
missed your questions i apologize but

1106
00:38:37,990 --> 00:38:35,280
when talking about the us government i

1107
00:38:39,750 --> 00:38:38,000
have to focus really hard because

1108
00:38:41,510 --> 00:38:39,760
it's a lot for me you know

1109
00:38:43,750 --> 00:38:41,520
coming from the uk especially so if i

1110
00:38:46,630 --> 00:38:43,760
missed your question i apologize we do

1111
00:38:48,390 --> 00:38:46,640
have one here from graham hello graham

1112
00:38:50,550 --> 00:38:48,400
does tim think that any lack of

1113
00:38:53,349 --> 00:38:50,560
cooperation and movement on the

1114
00:38:55,910 --> 00:38:53,359
usaf's part is down to legacy lack of

1115
00:38:59,670 --> 00:38:55,920
urgency or something else entirely great

1116
00:39:03,270 --> 00:39:02,069
all of the above

1117
00:39:05,589 --> 00:39:03,280
first of all it's great it's great to

1118
00:39:07,750 --> 00:39:05,599
hear from you graham um

1119
00:39:09,270 --> 00:39:07,760
and uh

1120
00:39:10,870 --> 00:39:09,280
yeah

1121
00:39:14,069 --> 00:39:10,880
all of the above

1122
00:39:14,870 --> 00:39:14,079
in in in a couple of ways so i don't

1123
00:39:17,349 --> 00:39:14,880
know

1124
00:39:19,829 --> 00:39:17,359
how much is purposeful

1125
00:39:20,950 --> 00:39:19,839
uh in terms of let's say a cover-up i

1126
00:39:23,829 --> 00:39:20,960
know a lot of people say there's a

1127
00:39:26,230 --> 00:39:23,839
cover-up maybe there is i don't know

1128
00:39:28,069 --> 00:39:26,240
i've never

1129
00:39:29,750 --> 00:39:28,079
encountered anything that that led me to

1130
00:39:32,150 --> 00:39:29,760
believe there was some kind of systemic

1131
00:39:33,510 --> 00:39:32,160
cover-up involving people who who

1132
00:39:35,829 --> 00:39:33,520
absolutely knew

1133
00:39:37,510 --> 00:39:35,839
for certain what the these objects were

1134
00:39:40,150 --> 00:39:37,520
that had crash retrievals this kind of

1135
00:39:41,670 --> 00:39:40,160
stuff maybe there are i just haven't

1136
00:39:42,950 --> 00:39:41,680
talked to those people i know that there

1137
00:39:45,270 --> 00:39:42,960
are some other people like ross

1138
00:39:47,270 --> 00:39:45,280
colthbert and others who have

1139
00:39:48,790 --> 00:39:47,280
um you know explored that particular

1140
00:39:50,950 --> 00:39:48,800
area so i don't want to make anybody mad

1141
00:39:52,870 --> 00:39:50,960
but i'm saying but what about the bodies

1142
00:39:55,109 --> 00:39:52,880
okay they maybe

1143
00:39:58,710 --> 00:39:55,119
um i just haven't encountered that

1144
00:40:00,550 --> 00:39:58,720
however um there is

1145
00:40:01,910 --> 00:40:00,560
de facto cover-up we have people who

1146
00:40:03,750 --> 00:40:01,920
feel like this isn't something they want

1147
00:40:05,270 --> 00:40:03,760
to discuss they don't want to deal with

1148
00:40:06,470 --> 00:40:05,280
it they don't want to be forced to deal

1149
00:40:08,790 --> 00:40:06,480
with it and so therefore they're going

1150
00:40:11,030 --> 00:40:08,800
to diminish it they're going to tell

1151
00:40:14,390 --> 00:40:11,040
people not to report it and everything

1152
00:40:17,349 --> 00:40:14,400
um not to cover up the existence of

1153
00:40:18,630 --> 00:40:17,359
something per se but but perhaps just to

1154
00:40:20,150 --> 00:40:18,640
try to make it go away because they

1155
00:40:22,150 --> 00:40:20,160
don't want to have to deal with it with

1156
00:40:24,069 --> 00:40:22,160
with the air force obviously they

1157
00:40:25,510 --> 00:40:24,079
handled blue book they were the ones in

1158
00:40:27,349 --> 00:40:25,520
charge of of

1159
00:40:29,430 --> 00:40:27,359
really the the only official

1160
00:40:31,750 --> 00:40:29,440
investigations that we saw

1161
00:40:33,670 --> 00:40:31,760
for the greater part up until recently

1162
00:40:36,230 --> 00:40:33,680
so the navy kind of stepped in and so i

1163
00:40:38,309 --> 00:40:36,240
would say there's probably uh some some

1164
00:40:40,950 --> 00:40:38,319
bitter taste or that has kind of

1165
00:40:42,790 --> 00:40:40,960
inherited yeah a legacy that has come

1166
00:40:44,550 --> 00:40:42,800
down from that because they really

1167
00:40:46,550 --> 00:40:44,560
wanted to wash their hands of it after

1168
00:40:47,910 --> 00:40:46,560
20 years of dealing with it but frankly

1169
00:40:49,829 --> 00:40:47,920
because i don't think they ever had it

1170
00:40:51,190 --> 00:40:49,839
they were no closer to

1171
00:40:52,390 --> 00:40:51,200
any answers

1172
00:40:55,030 --> 00:40:52,400
by the end than they were in the

1173
00:40:56,870 --> 00:40:55,040
beginning yeah it was the same thing

1174
00:40:57,990 --> 00:40:56,880
they're real we don't know what it is

1175
00:41:00,069 --> 00:40:58,000
and so

1176
00:41:01,589 --> 00:41:00,079
um i think that you have that and i

1177
00:41:04,710 --> 00:41:01,599
think that that

1178
00:41:07,109 --> 00:41:04,720
that comes down almost informally

1179
00:41:09,190 --> 00:41:07,119
where it's just the tone and and message

1180
00:41:11,589 --> 00:41:09,200
that's conveyed and that's the attitude

1181
00:41:13,190 --> 00:41:11,599
that is conveyed from above the officers

1182
00:41:14,950 --> 00:41:13,200
below and as they go through the ranks

1183
00:41:18,710 --> 00:41:14,960
it's the same one it stays it's kind of

1184
00:41:21,270 --> 00:41:18,720
a systemic uh willful apathy is what i

1185
00:41:22,870 --> 00:41:21,280
like to call it and so

1186
00:41:25,270 --> 00:41:22,880
i think that that out of all the

1187
00:41:26,390 --> 00:41:25,280
branches the air force would absolutely

1188
00:41:29,190 --> 00:41:26,400
be the one

1189
00:41:31,990 --> 00:41:29,200
uh that has that the most uh the where

1190
00:41:34,230 --> 00:41:32,000
the air force is also

1191
00:41:36,230 --> 00:41:34,240
it's an interesting branch out of all

1192
00:41:39,270 --> 00:41:36,240
the services

1193
00:41:41,670 --> 00:41:39,280
it's it's a different branch i will say

1194
00:41:44,150 --> 00:41:41,680
um from from growing up and being around

1195
00:41:46,710 --> 00:41:44,160
army branches my entire

1196
00:41:48,550 --> 00:41:46,720
life up until recently in germany i will

1197
00:41:50,870 --> 00:41:48,560
say it has been a difference coming

1198
00:41:53,109 --> 00:41:50,880
around an arm or an air force post and

1199
00:41:54,230 --> 00:41:53,119
so that in and of itself the air force

1200
00:41:56,870 --> 00:41:54,240
is just

1201
00:41:58,630 --> 00:41:56,880
it's a different branch there's just

1202
00:41:59,829 --> 00:41:58,640
different different people who typically

1203
00:42:01,430 --> 00:41:59,839
go in the air force and different

1204
00:42:03,349 --> 00:42:01,440
priorities and just

1205
00:42:06,790 --> 00:42:03,359
different approaches

1206
00:42:09,190 --> 00:42:06,800
and so i can't say for certain

1207
00:42:10,630 --> 00:42:09,200
what it is other than

1208
00:42:13,030 --> 00:42:10,640
it definitely out of everyone the air

1209
00:42:14,790 --> 00:42:13,040
force seems to be the most resistant

1210
00:42:17,910 --> 00:42:14,800
uh and i would say that if i had to

1211
00:42:20,550 --> 00:42:17,920
speculate it's probably a totality of

1212
00:42:22,470 --> 00:42:20,560
you know certainly

1213
00:42:24,230 --> 00:42:22,480
there's not twenty thousand thirty

1214
00:42:26,550 --> 00:42:24,240
thousand people who are in on the

1215
00:42:29,030 --> 00:42:26,560
cover-up so even if there's like this

1216
00:42:31,349 --> 00:42:29,040
you know small level uh that's that's

1217
00:42:33,190 --> 00:42:31,359
setting that tone the prevailing theme

1218
00:42:35,030 --> 00:42:33,200
as it's spread out is this kind of

1219
00:42:38,790 --> 00:42:35,040
willful apathy

1220
00:42:41,510 --> 00:42:38,800
yeah um jay allen here says uh vinnie

1221
00:42:42,710 --> 00:42:41,520
yousaf speaking so yep jay allen good to

1222
00:42:45,190 --> 00:42:42,720
see you my friend i know you're a

1223
00:42:47,270 --> 00:42:45,200
regular here um okay we admit they are

1224
00:42:50,150 --> 00:42:47,280
real and they on our towers or foreign

1225
00:42:52,069 --> 00:42:50,160
assets what now do we admit we can't do

1226
00:42:54,870 --> 00:42:52,079
anything about these incursions where is

1227
00:42:57,190 --> 00:42:54,880
the panic line

1228
00:42:59,829 --> 00:42:57,200
that's a i mean really great question

1229
00:43:01,990 --> 00:42:59,839
and so i think that uh i mean first of

1230
00:43:04,150 --> 00:43:02,000
all i think that if you reach a

1231
00:43:04,950 --> 00:43:04,160
definitive conclusion in which you say

1232
00:43:06,150 --> 00:43:04,960
okay

1233
00:43:09,510 --> 00:43:06,160
these are

1234
00:43:11,589 --> 00:43:09,520
ours

1235
00:43:12,550 --> 00:43:11,599
these are absolutely real

1236
00:43:15,030 --> 00:43:12,560
um

1237
00:43:17,510 --> 00:43:15,040
i think that now at this point in time

1238
00:43:19,670 --> 00:43:17,520
frankly if you want to see anything

1239
00:43:22,230 --> 00:43:19,680
meaningful done it has to be brought out

1240
00:43:24,950 --> 00:43:22,240
of uh the defense national security

1241
00:43:26,390 --> 00:43:24,960
sector because you they're going to

1242
00:43:28,630 --> 00:43:26,400
treat it exactly like they would a

1243
00:43:30,150 --> 00:43:28,640
defensive national security issue

1244
00:43:31,109 --> 00:43:30,160
uh and i'm not going to begrudge them

1245
00:43:32,790 --> 00:43:31,119
for that

1246
00:43:34,150 --> 00:43:32,800
and so when you're treating it like a

1247
00:43:35,190 --> 00:43:34,160
defense and national security issue

1248
00:43:36,630 --> 00:43:35,200
particularly if you're talking about

1249
00:43:39,430 --> 00:43:36,640
something that

1250
00:43:41,750 --> 00:43:39,440
you have no actual intelligence on and

1251
00:43:44,870 --> 00:43:41,760
you have no defense against and it can

1252
00:43:46,390 --> 00:43:44,880
move with impunity into your airspace

1253
00:43:49,589 --> 00:43:46,400
you you

1254
00:43:52,390 --> 00:43:49,599
you're entirely vulnerable to it that is

1255
00:43:54,630 --> 00:43:52,400
it under the guise of a defense issue

1256
00:43:56,470 --> 00:43:54,640
that is a huge

1257
00:43:59,349 --> 00:43:56,480
defense risk and it's something that you

1258
00:44:00,550 --> 00:43:59,359
treat as ultra classified you're not

1259
00:44:01,990 --> 00:44:00,560
going to discuss it it's not going to be

1260
00:44:04,309 --> 00:44:02,000
a public issue and it's going to be

1261
00:44:05,589 --> 00:44:04,319
narrow to those compartmentalized of

1262
00:44:07,829 --> 00:44:05,599
scopes

1263
00:44:10,630 --> 00:44:07,839
and i don't know that that's actually

1264
00:44:12,550 --> 00:44:10,640
beneficial whatsoever into solving

1265
00:44:14,309 --> 00:44:12,560
because that not only does that cut the

1266
00:44:16,710 --> 00:44:14,319
public out of the loop but it narrows

1267
00:44:18,870 --> 00:44:16,720
the scope of of people who could

1268
00:44:20,069 --> 00:44:18,880
potentially provide scientific or

1269
00:44:23,670 --> 00:44:20,079
academic

1270
00:44:25,750 --> 00:44:23,680
research and uh can contribute to

1271
00:44:28,230 --> 00:44:25,760
actually solving it and so i think if

1272
00:44:31,349 --> 00:44:28,240
that ever becomes the case it would be

1273
00:44:33,990 --> 00:44:31,359
extremely interesting uh if i was the

1274
00:44:37,670 --> 00:44:34,000
department of defense um and i reached

1275
00:44:39,829 --> 00:44:37,680
that conclusion i would gladly then say

1276
00:44:41,670 --> 00:44:39,839
go to the president whoever and say mr

1277
00:44:44,069 --> 00:44:41,680
president this is not a defense issue

1278
00:44:45,430 --> 00:44:44,079
this is a scientific technological

1279
00:44:46,950 --> 00:44:45,440
matter and we would like to hand this

1280
00:44:48,710 --> 00:44:46,960
off to

1281
00:44:50,870 --> 00:44:48,720
whoever

1282
00:44:53,910 --> 00:44:50,880
this is um

1283
00:44:56,150 --> 00:44:53,920
and i'd pass that buck to somebody um

1284
00:44:58,309 --> 00:44:56,160
who could treat it like a scientific

1285
00:45:00,870 --> 00:44:58,319
technical matter you know still provide

1286
00:45:02,470 --> 00:45:00,880
assistance you can still have

1287
00:45:04,309 --> 00:45:02,480
defense components that provide

1288
00:45:05,589 --> 00:45:04,319
assistance through classified sensor

1289
00:45:08,470 --> 00:45:05,599
systems this kind of stuff you can still

1290
00:45:10,470 --> 00:45:08,480
provide that information but do it under

1291
00:45:12,150 --> 00:45:10,480
a scientific context

1292
00:45:15,109 --> 00:45:12,160
yeah sure

1293
00:45:16,790 --> 00:45:15,119
uh dan's here as well hello dan uh tim

1294
00:45:19,030 --> 00:45:16,800
do you know if censors have been tasked

1295
00:45:22,790 --> 00:45:19,040
with tracking uap using parameters set

1296
00:45:27,270 --> 00:45:24,390
for a fact no

1297
00:45:29,750 --> 00:45:27,280
uh have i heard lots of of

1298
00:45:33,030 --> 00:45:29,760
rumors or mummers or

1299
00:45:36,550 --> 00:45:33,040
have i heard from people who have worked

1300
00:45:38,470 --> 00:45:36,560
in even the more modern uap programs um

1301
00:45:40,550 --> 00:45:38,480
or even who have worked in other

1302
00:45:43,190 --> 00:45:40,560
branches of government who

1303
00:45:44,470 --> 00:45:43,200
would have tasking on this so so maybe

1304
00:45:46,950 --> 00:45:44,480
they weren't assigned to the task force

1305
00:45:49,349 --> 00:45:46,960
let's say but if they work at an agency

1306
00:45:51,109 --> 00:45:49,359
uh that might have certain sensor suites

1307
00:45:53,030 --> 00:45:51,119
and and somebody the task force might

1308
00:45:55,510 --> 00:45:53,040
call them up they might be their uh

1309
00:45:57,829 --> 00:45:55,520
billet their liaison to it have they

1310
00:46:00,390 --> 00:45:57,839
been asked to do that kind of thing they

1311
00:46:02,550 --> 00:46:00,400
i have been told yes now what those

1312
00:46:04,710 --> 00:46:02,560
parameters are i don't know uh that kind

1313
00:46:06,870 --> 00:46:04,720
of stuff is classified with the sensors

1314
00:46:08,309 --> 00:46:06,880
themselves or different systems being

1315
00:46:09,990 --> 00:46:08,319
used i don't know

1316
00:46:12,309 --> 00:46:10,000
all of that is classified

1317
00:46:13,349 --> 00:46:12,319
um you know i caveat that when you know

1318
00:46:15,030 --> 00:46:13,359
because i started that by saying i've

1319
00:46:16,470 --> 00:46:15,040
heard rumors and you're saying but tim

1320
00:46:17,750 --> 00:46:16,480
you you're saying you've talked to

1321
00:46:19,430 --> 00:46:17,760
people who work in government that work

1322
00:46:21,510 --> 00:46:19,440
at this place who've said it that's not

1323
00:46:22,390 --> 00:46:21,520
a rumor that should be firsthand

1324
00:46:24,870 --> 00:46:22,400
um

1325
00:46:26,630 --> 00:46:24,880
yes that's correct and i think in a lot

1326
00:46:29,270 --> 00:46:26,640
of instances maybe that's better than

1327
00:46:31,750 --> 00:46:29,280
rumors but at the same time

1328
00:46:33,670 --> 00:46:31,760
i say that under the big caveat that

1329
00:46:35,829 --> 00:46:33,680
that's always first

1330
00:46:38,069 --> 00:46:35,839
you only have one source that's saying

1331
00:46:40,150 --> 00:46:38,079
that you only have one person

1332
00:46:41,910 --> 00:46:40,160
and uh for obvious reasons there's no

1333
00:46:44,069 --> 00:46:41,920
material evidence to support that kind

1334
00:46:46,710 --> 00:46:44,079
of claim and so for something like that

1335
00:46:49,589 --> 00:46:46,720
me to say definitively

1336
00:46:52,470 --> 00:46:49,599
i would need kind of multiple people

1337
00:46:54,069 --> 00:46:52,480
to all corroborate the same thing or

1338
00:46:56,470 --> 00:46:54,079
physical evidence and that's extremely

1339
00:46:59,030 --> 00:46:56,480
hard to do since even hearing about it

1340
00:47:00,950 --> 00:46:59,040
is kind of dancing the line

1341
00:47:03,030 --> 00:47:00,960
of what's classified but but i have

1342
00:47:05,589 --> 00:47:03,040
heard that that

1343
00:47:08,069 --> 00:47:05,599
is the case and i don't know if that's

1344
00:47:10,790 --> 00:47:08,079
i've heard nuclear as well i don't know

1345
00:47:12,390 --> 00:47:10,800
in what context

1346
00:47:14,390 --> 00:47:12,400
you know whether that is just merely

1347
00:47:16,790 --> 00:47:14,400
monitoring certain nuclear

1348
00:47:18,550 --> 00:47:16,800
assets when they're in place such as the

1349
00:47:20,870 --> 00:47:18,560
aircraft carriers the nuclear power that

1350
00:47:22,870 --> 00:47:20,880
are on them whether it's nuclear-powered

1351
00:47:25,349 --> 00:47:22,880
submarines whether it's submarines with

1352
00:47:27,990 --> 00:47:25,359
nuclear warheads i don't know that that

1353
00:47:30,069 --> 00:47:28,000
but i know that that nuclear energy has

1354
00:47:31,910 --> 00:47:30,079
always come up a lot in those kind of

1355
00:47:33,349 --> 00:47:31,920
conversations

1356
00:47:36,470 --> 00:47:33,359
yeah for sure

1357
00:47:38,390 --> 00:47:36,480
um yonei asks tim i wonder since you

1358
00:47:40,390 --> 00:47:38,400
live in germany does the government pay

1359
00:47:42,069 --> 00:47:40,400
any attention to the phenomena or is it

1360
00:47:43,510 --> 00:47:42,079
covered in the news here in the

1361
00:47:45,030 --> 00:47:43,520
netherlands unfortunately it's not

1362
00:47:47,270 --> 00:47:45,040
covered at all

1363
00:47:50,069 --> 00:47:47,280
yeah absolutely not

1364
00:47:53,270 --> 00:47:50,079
absolutely not i would say that

1365
00:47:56,710 --> 00:47:53,280
it is um almost

1366
00:47:59,910 --> 00:47:56,720
non-existent you know in german media um

1367
00:48:02,870 --> 00:47:59,920
and and the general german public uh

1368
00:48:05,670 --> 00:48:02,880
uh for the most part i would say is is

1369
00:48:06,710 --> 00:48:05,680
certainly not even near as interested as

1370
00:48:08,309 --> 00:48:06,720
um

1371
00:48:10,870 --> 00:48:08,319
as people in especially in the united

1372
00:48:12,790 --> 00:48:10,880
states in the united kingdom and so but

1373
00:48:14,309 --> 00:48:12,800
it's it's absolutely not on the news i

1374
00:48:16,710 --> 00:48:14,319
can tell you that much even at the

1375
00:48:18,150 --> 00:48:16,720
height of um

1376
00:48:19,510 --> 00:48:18,160
you know when the when the u.s

1377
00:48:21,589 --> 00:48:19,520
department of defense is talking about

1378
00:48:23,270 --> 00:48:21,599
it when the u.s is is passing bills

1379
00:48:24,950 --> 00:48:23,280
about it so even when you you see

1380
00:48:27,589 --> 00:48:24,960
politico and the washington post and the

1381
00:48:30,790 --> 00:48:27,599
new york times um

1382
00:48:32,069 --> 00:48:30,800
german media is not covering that

1383
00:48:34,470 --> 00:48:32,079
whatsoever

1384
00:48:35,990 --> 00:48:34,480
so yeah no

1385
00:48:38,390 --> 00:48:36,000
we it's it's funny because here in the

1386
00:48:39,829 --> 00:48:38,400
uk we we want more it to be taken more

1387
00:48:42,030 --> 00:48:39,839
seriously but then we get the sun and

1388
00:48:44,950 --> 00:48:42,040
the daily star putting out these just

1389
00:48:47,430 --> 00:48:44,960
sensationalist nonsense stories nine

1390
00:48:49,430 --> 00:48:47,440
times out of ten and it really doesn't

1391
00:48:51,589 --> 00:48:49,440
help at all but then the odd the odd

1392
00:48:54,950 --> 00:48:51,599
article does have you know

1393
00:48:57,750 --> 00:48:54,960
some some weight to it it's difficult

1394
00:49:00,069 --> 00:48:57,760
it is i i would say that the the uk

1395
00:49:02,150 --> 00:49:00,079
media has kind of come in second uh and

1396
00:49:05,349 --> 00:49:02,160
i think it matches with the interest

1397
00:49:07,589 --> 00:49:05,359
level as well uh australia has done some

1398
00:49:08,549 --> 00:49:07,599
some fairly decent stuff i i think it

1399
00:49:14,790 --> 00:49:08,559
takes

1400
00:49:16,870 --> 00:49:14,800
markets or anybody to to specifically

1401
00:49:19,030 --> 00:49:16,880
task a journalist you know an editor say

1402
00:49:20,470 --> 00:49:19,040
look what the hell's going on over the

1403
00:49:22,230 --> 00:49:20,480
united states with this i need you to

1404
00:49:24,230 --> 00:49:22,240
try to get to the bottom of it

1405
00:49:26,150 --> 00:49:24,240
uh where you can get a really rich and

1406
00:49:28,069 --> 00:49:26,160
in-depth kind of article or news piece

1407
00:49:29,430 --> 00:49:28,079
to be brought to a different foreign

1408
00:49:31,190 --> 00:49:29,440
market

1409
00:49:34,309 --> 00:49:31,200
unfortunately

1410
00:49:36,069 --> 00:49:34,319
that really hasn't been done it it isn't

1411
00:49:37,190 --> 00:49:36,079
done uh

1412
00:49:39,030 --> 00:49:37,200
and

1413
00:49:41,829 --> 00:49:39,040
i think it's probably mitigating with

1414
00:49:43,990 --> 00:49:41,839
these news companies a resources so so

1415
00:49:44,870 --> 00:49:44,000
your foreign correspondents are limited

1416
00:49:46,870 --> 00:49:44,880
um

1417
00:49:49,109 --> 00:49:46,880
and you know what do you designate them

1418
00:49:51,270 --> 00:49:49,119
to do that type of thing and maybe the

1419
00:49:52,630 --> 00:49:51,280
general idea of prevailing belief that

1420
00:49:55,109 --> 00:49:52,640
it's not going to be

1421
00:49:58,309 --> 00:49:55,119
very interesting to your audience and

1422
00:50:00,790 --> 00:49:58,319
and for here in germany that i would say

1423
00:50:03,589 --> 00:50:00,800
that that's a big factor i mean a lot of

1424
00:50:05,349 --> 00:50:03,599
things that that are uh

1425
00:50:07,990 --> 00:50:05,359
that seem very normal that we're very

1426
00:50:09,670 --> 00:50:08,000
accustomed to you you couldn't turn on a

1427
00:50:11,829 --> 00:50:09,680
television show in the u.s without some

1428
00:50:14,069 --> 00:50:11,839
kind of paranormal or ghost hunting show

1429
00:50:15,990 --> 00:50:14,079
or something like that that's just

1430
00:50:16,950 --> 00:50:16,000
not something that the people

1431
00:50:18,870 --> 00:50:16,960
um

1432
00:50:20,470 --> 00:50:18,880
in germany are really interested in

1433
00:50:22,549 --> 00:50:20,480
whatsoever yeah

1434
00:50:24,630 --> 00:50:22,559
no i can understand it i mean hopefully

1435
00:50:26,549 --> 00:50:24,640
in the future as this all picks up that

1436
00:50:28,710 --> 00:50:26,559
might change but i guess again it's

1437
00:50:30,870 --> 00:50:28,720
patience and time

1438
00:50:33,109 --> 00:50:30,880
i would i would hope so i mean i you

1439
00:50:34,950 --> 00:50:33,119
know i will be the first to admit i like

1440
00:50:37,430 --> 00:50:34,960
a good ghost story and i'm surrounded by

1441
00:50:39,270 --> 00:50:37,440
hundreds of years of history and tragic

1442
00:50:40,710 --> 00:50:39,280
battles and uh you know it was one of

1443
00:50:42,150 --> 00:50:40,720
the things i actually looked for i was

1444
00:50:44,790 --> 00:50:42,160
like man is there any good ghost stories

1445
00:50:47,430 --> 00:50:44,800
around here you know we just they're fun

1446
00:50:49,109 --> 00:50:47,440
legends and uh yeah only i only found

1447
00:50:51,589 --> 00:50:49,119
one uh

1448
00:50:53,190 --> 00:50:51,599
here near me about a werewolf which i

1449
00:50:55,270 --> 00:50:53,200
need to publish that article i may hold

1450
00:50:58,069 --> 00:50:55,280
it until halloween this year but that's

1451
00:51:00,230 --> 00:50:58,079
a good idea i i will i will i'll give

1452
00:51:03,190 --> 00:51:00,240
you the exclusive teaser

1453
00:51:06,069 --> 00:51:03,200
i actually tracked down

1454
00:51:08,950 --> 00:51:06,079
the last european werewolf

1455
00:51:11,109 --> 00:51:08,960
whoa the actual person

1456
00:51:13,190 --> 00:51:11,119
the actual person so the legend is out

1457
00:51:15,270 --> 00:51:13,200
there if you look at the morbach monster

1458
00:51:16,950 --> 00:51:15,280
in germany which is not far from me you

1459
00:51:19,190 --> 00:51:16,960
might be able to find it but but after

1460
00:51:21,750 --> 00:51:19,200
extensive i'm embarrassed to even say

1461
00:51:24,150 --> 00:51:21,760
how much work i did into it going to

1462
00:51:26,390 --> 00:51:24,160
going to national archives in france it

1463
00:51:27,510 --> 00:51:26,400
became an obsession just to find this

1464
00:51:28,790 --> 00:51:27,520
werewolf

1465
00:51:30,549 --> 00:51:28,800
and uh

1466
00:51:33,030 --> 00:51:30,559
i not only found the grave but the

1467
00:51:34,950 --> 00:51:33,040
actual person that is supposedly the

1468
00:51:36,470 --> 00:51:34,960
werewolf so

1469
00:51:38,230 --> 00:51:36,480
i need to publish it

1470
00:51:39,670 --> 00:51:38,240
maybe i'll handle it and yeah i don't

1471
00:51:41,589 --> 00:51:39,680
have impressed like i said it became an

1472
00:51:43,510 --> 00:51:41,599
obsession who who goes to france to look

1473
00:51:45,510 --> 00:51:43,520
through archives and stuff to find them

1474
00:51:47,670 --> 00:51:45,520
but uh but it became this interesting

1475
00:51:49,430 --> 00:51:47,680
thing were they real you know

1476
00:51:51,750 --> 00:51:49,440
it's a long way of me saying that i

1477
00:51:53,829 --> 00:51:51,760
enjoy a good paranormal story

1478
00:51:55,430 --> 00:51:53,839
yeah yeah absolutely we're steeped in it

1479
00:51:57,670 --> 00:51:55,440
here in the uk so i could fully

1480
00:51:59,750 --> 00:51:57,680
appreciate that absolutely

1481
00:52:00,950 --> 00:51:59,760
um now listen we're running up almost

1482
00:52:04,069 --> 00:52:00,960
against the clock i'm going to ask you

1483
00:52:06,069 --> 00:52:04,079
this one last question

1484
00:52:08,870 --> 00:52:06,079
on another show recently you were asked

1485
00:52:10,630 --> 00:52:08,880
about the 23 minute video that is

1486
00:52:11,910 --> 00:52:10,640
now kind of infamous in the halls of

1487
00:52:12,790 --> 00:52:11,920
ufology

1488
00:52:14,309 --> 00:52:12,800
um

1489
00:52:16,710 --> 00:52:14,319
but you stated that you believe there's

1490
00:52:19,030 --> 00:52:16,720
probably better footage out there

1491
00:52:20,950 --> 00:52:19,040
now to what extent

1492
00:52:22,470 --> 00:52:20,960
do you know that that's the case or have

1493
00:52:24,069 --> 00:52:22,480
you been told anything

1494
00:52:25,270 --> 00:52:24,079
can you elaborate on why you made that

1495
00:52:27,430 --> 00:52:25,280
statement

1496
00:52:28,309 --> 00:52:27,440
sure yeah um

1497
00:52:31,430 --> 00:52:28,319
yeah

1498
00:52:33,109 --> 00:52:31,440
in terms of the the 23 minute video you

1499
00:52:34,710 --> 00:52:33,119
know that uh

1500
00:52:36,309 --> 00:52:34,720
i certainly

1501
00:52:38,470 --> 00:52:36,319
believe i don't know what it shows but i

1502
00:52:41,349 --> 00:52:38,480
do believe it exists primarily because

1503
00:52:43,349 --> 00:52:41,359
my sourcing on its existence uh

1504
00:52:44,150 --> 00:52:43,359
came from some leaked documents that

1505
00:52:45,589 --> 00:52:44,160
were

1506
00:52:47,990 --> 00:52:45,599
official and so

1507
00:52:50,710 --> 00:52:48,000
i would assume that one would not just

1508
00:52:53,030 --> 00:52:50,720
falsify uh you know documents to that

1509
00:52:55,430 --> 00:52:53,040
extent but again i don't know what

1510
00:52:56,950 --> 00:52:55,440
uh i don't know exactly what it shows

1511
00:52:57,910 --> 00:52:56,960
but but it was specific enough that i

1512
00:52:59,910 --> 00:52:57,920
you know

1513
00:53:01,270 --> 00:52:59,920
say 23 minutes and 47 seconds or

1514
00:53:03,750 --> 00:53:01,280
something like there was an exact kind

1515
00:53:05,990 --> 00:53:03,760
of time frame on there uh but but when i

1516
00:53:07,829 --> 00:53:06,000
said that my belief that um

1517
00:53:11,910 --> 00:53:07,839
there was better information is that

1518
00:53:15,910 --> 00:53:11,920
particular video in question there

1519
00:53:23,349 --> 00:53:19,829
2013 2014 to 15 time frame it's just

1520
00:53:26,309 --> 00:53:23,359
based on the documents i saw and so um

1521
00:53:27,750 --> 00:53:26,319
you know there's better technology

1522
00:53:29,910 --> 00:53:27,760
in the past

1523
00:53:32,069 --> 00:53:29,920
seven eight six years

1524
00:53:33,430 --> 00:53:32,079
in addition to tasking different

1525
00:53:36,549 --> 00:53:33,440
technology

1526
00:53:38,950 --> 00:53:36,559
and uh you know we have been there's

1527
00:53:43,349 --> 00:53:38,960
been a lot of

1528
00:53:44,950 --> 00:53:43,359
curious defense issues that have arrived

1529
00:53:47,270 --> 00:53:44,960
than in the last few years that don't

1530
00:53:49,109 --> 00:53:47,280
relate to uap but rather let's say the

1531
00:53:50,630 --> 00:53:49,119
situation in ukraine you know russia was

1532
00:53:52,630 --> 00:53:50,640
building up this

1533
00:53:54,870 --> 00:53:52,640
for this invasion for over a year

1534
00:53:57,190 --> 00:53:54,880
you have the situation going on in china

1535
00:53:59,990 --> 00:53:57,200
which is really heated up in the last

1536
00:54:01,829 --> 00:54:00,000
five six years um and then obviously

1537
00:54:03,990 --> 00:54:01,839
you've got iran you've got all these

1538
00:54:05,750 --> 00:54:04,000
different issues that require a lot of

1539
00:54:07,190 --> 00:54:05,760
precise intelligence you want to know

1540
00:54:09,030 --> 00:54:07,200
technical intelligence what are they

1541
00:54:11,270 --> 00:54:09,040
testing what are they flying these types

1542
00:54:13,190 --> 00:54:11,280
of things so that means that you

1543
00:54:15,430 --> 00:54:13,200
both develop enhance

1544
00:54:17,750 --> 00:54:15,440
sensor capabilities and intelligence

1545
00:54:20,309 --> 00:54:17,760
capabilities to gather different forms

1546
00:54:22,470 --> 00:54:20,319
of data and you employ them

1547
00:54:25,829 --> 00:54:22,480
potentially to more extreme than you

1548
00:54:27,589 --> 00:54:25,839
have in the past after the early 1990s

1549
00:54:29,829 --> 00:54:27,599
we really weren't spying on russia all

1550
00:54:31,270 --> 00:54:29,839
that much we could in fact we could

1551
00:54:32,710 --> 00:54:31,280
we could buy the plans the nukes for a

1552
00:54:33,910 --> 00:54:32,720
bottle of vodka

1553
00:54:35,990 --> 00:54:33,920
after

1554
00:54:39,190 --> 00:54:36,000
the collapse of the soviet union so you

1555
00:54:41,109 --> 00:54:39,200
didn't necessarily need to to rely on

1556
00:54:42,950 --> 00:54:41,119
some of your your more covert or your

1557
00:54:44,710 --> 00:54:42,960
more technological methods of collection

1558
00:54:46,870 --> 00:54:44,720
that's not been the case

1559
00:54:48,870 --> 00:54:46,880
and a lot of what we see where we see a

1560
00:54:50,390 --> 00:54:48,880
really kind of turbulent time right now

1561
00:54:52,309 --> 00:54:50,400
i mean where there's a war the biggest

1562
00:54:54,150 --> 00:54:52,319
war in europe that's been building for

1563
00:54:56,309 --> 00:54:54,160
the last couple of years and i think uh

1564
00:54:57,670 --> 00:54:56,319
in the defense community it has been

1565
00:54:58,789 --> 00:54:57,680
firmly aware of it didn't know whether

1566
00:55:00,710 --> 00:54:58,799
it would be china didn't know whether it

1567
00:55:01,829 --> 00:55:00,720
be russia but you knew what's going on

1568
00:55:04,230 --> 00:55:01,839
and so

1569
00:55:06,870 --> 00:55:04,240
de facto in spying on those types of

1570
00:55:09,589 --> 00:55:06,880
things you're going to encounter things

1571
00:55:11,829 --> 00:55:09,599
that are more frequent uh and so i think

1572
00:55:13,829 --> 00:55:11,839
that that in itself a the technology is

1573
00:55:16,950 --> 00:55:13,839
better b the potential to encounter it

1574
00:55:20,309 --> 00:55:16,960
is more frequent and i think uh given

1575
00:55:22,470 --> 00:55:20,319
the fact is particularly post 2017 when

1576
00:55:23,109 --> 00:55:22,480
when louis lozando came out atip came

1577
00:55:26,150 --> 00:55:23,119
out

1578
00:55:28,630 --> 00:55:26,160
suddenly people in government who who

1579
00:55:30,870 --> 00:55:28,640
had access to these things were like oh

1580
00:55:32,390 --> 00:55:30,880
cool i can i can look through this let

1581
00:55:35,190 --> 00:55:32,400
me look through some of my data or let

1582
00:55:37,349 --> 00:55:35,200
me actually use my assets specifically

1583
00:55:39,030 --> 00:55:37,359
look at certain things you can do that

1584
00:55:41,670 --> 00:55:39,040
and that goes back to what i mentioned

1585
00:55:43,990 --> 00:55:41,680
first earlier this idea that some of the

1586
00:55:45,990 --> 00:55:44,000
best work in government is done

1587
00:55:48,069 --> 00:55:46,000
not necessarily by an office with a big

1588
00:55:50,230 --> 00:55:48,079
flag pull-up point out front that says

1589
00:55:51,910 --> 00:55:50,240
you know uap agency

1590
00:55:54,950 --> 00:55:51,920
rather by by the

1591
00:55:57,349 --> 00:55:54,960
the analyst or the person who has access

1592
00:55:59,990 --> 00:55:57,359
to satellite technologies or airborne

1593
00:56:01,589 --> 00:56:00,000
technologies who says hey you know what

1594
00:56:04,230 --> 00:56:01,599
i'm going to go through and look at this

1595
00:56:05,589 --> 00:56:04,240
or you know what we've got a nuclear

1596
00:56:07,510 --> 00:56:05,599
carrier that's moving through the

1597
00:56:09,270 --> 00:56:07,520
mediterranean and i've got an airborne

1598
00:56:11,190 --> 00:56:09,280
asset i think i'm gonna watch it for a

1599
00:56:12,950 --> 00:56:11,200
while let's see if anything pops up over

1600
00:56:13,990 --> 00:56:12,960
here let's see what we get

1601
00:56:15,670 --> 00:56:14,000
and i know

1602
00:56:16,950 --> 00:56:15,680
i can for a fact

1603
00:56:19,990 --> 00:56:16,960
in some of the

1604
00:56:21,510 --> 00:56:20,000
um classified uh or excuse me they're

1605
00:56:23,750 --> 00:56:21,520
not classified but they're secure so

1606
00:56:27,829 --> 00:56:23,760
they're intelligence community only type

1607
00:56:29,430 --> 00:56:27,839
chat rooms they have uh at our space um

1608
00:56:30,950 --> 00:56:29,440
there was especially in the last year

1609
00:56:32,549 --> 00:56:30,960
there's been considerable chatter so

1610
00:56:34,309 --> 00:56:32,559
these are

1611
00:56:36,470 --> 00:56:34,319
it's kind of like discord for for

1612
00:56:37,910 --> 00:56:36,480
intelligence personnel where they can

1613
00:56:40,230 --> 00:56:37,920
discuss different things and they can

1614
00:56:41,190 --> 00:56:40,240
come together and these um you know

1615
00:56:42,789 --> 00:56:41,200
these

1616
00:56:43,990 --> 00:56:42,799
particularly with the uap topic you had

1617
00:56:45,430 --> 00:56:44,000
high level people that were coming

1618
00:56:46,549 --> 00:56:45,440
together and discussing it and so

1619
00:56:49,670 --> 00:56:46,559
suddenly

1620
00:56:50,549 --> 00:56:49,680
once it became acceptable i think that

1621
00:56:51,589 --> 00:56:50,559
people

1622
00:56:53,030 --> 00:56:51,599
stopped

1623
00:56:55,190 --> 00:56:53,040
throwing out

1624
00:56:56,549 --> 00:56:55,200
potentially good stuff into the trash

1625
00:56:58,950 --> 00:56:56,559
bin because they didn't think anybody

1626
00:57:01,349 --> 00:56:58,960
was they were told

1627
00:57:03,589 --> 00:57:01,359
to throw it out or that was the impli

1628
00:57:05,510 --> 00:57:03,599
implication throw it out uh and they

1629
00:57:09,190 --> 00:57:05,520
started looking for it and so i think

1630
00:57:11,750 --> 00:57:09,200
that that uh that definitely is

1631
00:57:13,270 --> 00:57:11,760
the impetus behind that statement uh on

1632
00:57:15,589 --> 00:57:13,280
top of the fact that there's been

1633
00:57:16,630 --> 00:57:15,599
there's certainly been plenty of people

1634
00:57:19,270 --> 00:57:16,640
who

1635
00:57:22,150 --> 00:57:19,280
were absolutely in the position to to

1636
00:57:23,270 --> 00:57:22,160
know who have said there is much better

1637
00:57:25,030 --> 00:57:23,280
stuff

1638
00:57:26,710 --> 00:57:25,040
yeah thank you so much that makes so

1639
00:57:29,670 --> 00:57:26,720
much sense yeah

1640
00:57:31,990 --> 00:57:29,680
i like that absolutely

1641
00:57:33,430 --> 00:57:32,000
down to it because i mentioned this and

1642
00:57:35,670 --> 00:57:33,440
i'll just say this i mentioned this in

1643
00:57:37,910 --> 00:57:35,680
an article myself and tom rogan wrote

1644
00:57:40,870 --> 00:57:37,920
for the debrief a year ago tom rogan

1645
00:57:42,390 --> 00:57:40,880
from washington examiner and um i said

1646
00:57:44,150 --> 00:57:42,400
that some of the best intelligence or

1647
00:57:45,990 --> 00:57:44,160
some of the best stuff that they had was

1648
00:57:47,270 --> 00:57:46,000
mason measurement and signals

1649
00:57:49,190 --> 00:57:47,280
intelligence

1650
00:57:51,510 --> 00:57:49,200
and i think

1651
00:57:54,390 --> 00:57:51,520
with the uap

1652
00:57:55,589 --> 00:57:54,400
report that came out um the june report

1653
00:57:57,589 --> 00:57:55,599
the preliminary report i think it

1654
00:57:58,630 --> 00:57:57,599
mentioned something about not having any

1655
00:58:00,549 --> 00:57:58,640
mason

1656
00:58:01,990 --> 00:58:00,559
and uh i think some people were like

1657
00:58:05,910 --> 00:58:02,000
ah-ha

1658
00:58:09,910 --> 00:58:05,920
you know there is none and uh you know

1659
00:58:11,829 --> 00:58:09,920
to that the point of that is is that uh

1660
00:58:12,870 --> 00:58:11,839
measurement signals that you collect is

1661
00:58:15,589 --> 00:58:12,880
evidence

1662
00:58:17,510 --> 00:58:15,599
the inability to collect

1663
00:58:20,470 --> 00:58:17,520
certain measurement and signals

1664
00:58:22,309 --> 00:58:20,480
is evidence and so

1665
00:58:24,789 --> 00:58:22,319
the point there being that some of the

1666
00:58:26,150 --> 00:58:24,799
best uh evidence is that when you have

1667
00:58:29,589 --> 00:58:26,160
some of the

1668
00:58:30,789 --> 00:58:29,599
world's best sensor suites and platforms

1669
00:58:32,470 --> 00:58:30,799
that can

1670
00:58:34,230 --> 00:58:32,480
tell you the exact plane they can tell

1671
00:58:36,470 --> 00:58:34,240
you you know that plane's being piloted

1672
00:58:38,950 --> 00:58:36,480
by you know sergi

1673
00:58:40,870 --> 00:58:38,960
his wife just left him and he had chili

1674
00:58:43,030 --> 00:58:40,880
for breakfast you know like they're that

1675
00:58:44,789 --> 00:58:43,040
good but when they're not able to give

1676
00:58:47,589 --> 00:58:44,799
you anything and they're not able to

1677
00:58:50,230 --> 00:58:47,599
even register that this is a mechanical

1678
00:58:52,230 --> 00:58:50,240
device this is an electronic device that

1679
00:58:54,230 --> 00:58:52,240
in itself is significant evidence

1680
00:58:57,109 --> 00:58:54,240
because that's not normal

1681
00:58:59,190 --> 00:58:57,119
so when you can detect even your best

1682
00:59:01,030 --> 00:58:59,200
adversary stealth

1683
00:59:02,789 --> 00:59:01,040
aerospace technologies but then you

1684
00:59:05,829 --> 00:59:02,799
cannot detect

1685
00:59:07,670 --> 00:59:05,839
this whatsoever that is evidence

1686
00:59:08,870 --> 00:59:07,680
so i think

1687
00:59:10,069 --> 00:59:08,880
there's a lot

1688
00:59:11,589 --> 00:59:10,079
there i know everybody wants the

1689
00:59:13,349 --> 00:59:11,599
pictures and videos though that's the

1690
00:59:17,109 --> 00:59:13,359
sexy stuff

1691
00:59:19,270 --> 00:59:17,119
uh which is understandable but you know

1692
00:59:21,270 --> 00:59:19,280
yeah each to their own you know i like

1693
00:59:22,710 --> 00:59:21,280
the data i like these kind of

1694
00:59:24,309 --> 00:59:22,720
discussions and what we're seeing

1695
00:59:25,829 --> 00:59:24,319
happening going through the government

1696
00:59:27,430 --> 00:59:25,839
now a lot of people will just go well i

1697
00:59:28,630 --> 00:59:27,440
don't trust the government i'm ignoring

1698
00:59:30,470 --> 00:59:28,640
that well

1699
00:59:31,349 --> 00:59:30,480
that's up to them but

1700
00:59:33,829 --> 00:59:31,359
yeah

1701
00:59:35,589 --> 00:59:33,839
i'm different

1702
00:59:37,910 --> 00:59:35,599
it's always a

1703
00:59:39,990 --> 00:59:37,920
a totality of everything i said if it

1704
00:59:42,069 --> 00:59:40,000
was just one person saying one thing

1705
00:59:44,390 --> 00:59:42,079
then i think there's absolutely reason

1706
00:59:46,309 --> 00:59:44,400
to be hesitant or question

1707
00:59:48,390 --> 00:59:46,319
or be suspicious better yet everybody

1708
00:59:49,910 --> 00:59:48,400
should nothing wrong with questioning uh

1709
00:59:52,150 --> 00:59:49,920
but i think when you've got an abundance

1710
00:59:55,030 --> 00:59:52,160
of people that are kind of saying the

1711
00:59:57,910 --> 00:59:55,040
same things uh it's interesting it's

1712
01:00:00,150 --> 00:59:57,920
it's certainly interesting i think yeah

1713
01:00:03,270 --> 01:00:00,160
for anyone in the united states if if

1714
01:00:06,069 --> 01:00:03,280
they really really really want to know

1715
01:00:07,510 --> 01:00:06,079
so so so badly my recommendation to be

1716
01:00:08,309 --> 01:00:07,520
to them would be

1717
01:00:09,750 --> 01:00:08,319
uh

1718
01:00:12,150 --> 01:00:09,760
well they're running a little late for

1719
01:00:14,069 --> 01:00:12,160
this midterm but but the next elections

1720
01:00:15,750 --> 01:00:14,079
man run for office and try to get on the

1721
01:00:17,670 --> 01:00:15,760
intel committee yeah

1722
01:00:20,309 --> 01:00:17,680
if you wanna i mean i know we push them

1723
01:00:21,190 --> 01:00:20,319
in everything i know we we send a lot of

1724
01:00:22,710 --> 01:00:21,200
uh

1725
01:00:24,789 --> 01:00:22,720
people send a lot of political things

1726
01:00:25,589 --> 01:00:24,799
and contact their lawmakers as they

1727
01:00:27,349 --> 01:00:25,599
should

1728
01:00:29,270 --> 01:00:27,359
uh but at the end of the day if you

1729
01:00:30,309 --> 01:00:29,280
really really want to know you know

1730
01:00:33,349 --> 01:00:30,319
maybe

1731
01:00:37,589 --> 01:00:33,359
launch the campaign man you know

1732
01:00:39,270 --> 01:00:37,599
so and so for congress and get the win

1733
01:00:41,190 --> 01:00:39,280
let me know if you do you let me know i

1734
01:00:42,789 --> 01:00:41,200
might have a new source so keep me you

1735
01:00:46,230 --> 01:00:42,799
know if that happens

1736
01:00:49,990 --> 01:00:48,309
sound advice well tim we've just about

1737
01:00:51,670 --> 01:00:50,000
hit the hour i really really want to

1738
01:00:53,670 --> 01:00:51,680
thank you so much for coming on it's

1739
01:00:56,230 --> 01:00:53,680
always a great conversation

1740
01:00:57,990 --> 01:00:56,240
sure everybody here

1741
01:00:59,670 --> 01:00:58,000
anytime and we have to do it regularly

1742
01:01:01,829 --> 01:00:59,680
because i could you know i could do this

1743
01:01:03,430 --> 01:01:01,839
for hours uh everyone in the live chat

1744
01:01:04,710 --> 01:01:03,440
thank you so much for being cordial

1745
01:01:06,789 --> 01:01:04,720
keeping it a really pleasant

1746
01:01:08,470 --> 01:01:06,799
conversation from what i've seen uh

1747
01:01:10,150 --> 01:01:08,480
anybody that's listening to this after

1748
01:01:12,390 --> 01:01:10,160
the fact on the anomalous podcast

1749
01:01:13,430 --> 01:01:12,400
podcast network thank you so much as

1750
01:01:14,950 --> 01:01:13,440
well

1751
01:01:17,270 --> 01:01:14,960
i'm going to be back next week with

1752
01:01:18,309 --> 01:01:17,280
caroline corey director of a tear in the

1753
01:01:20,789 --> 01:01:18,319
sky

1754
01:01:22,470 --> 01:01:20,799
i'm also going to be on instagram this

1755
01:01:25,349 --> 01:01:22,480
week with graham rendell talking about

1756
01:01:26,870 --> 01:01:25,359
his new book and then the

1757
01:01:28,630 --> 01:01:26,880
i'm losing track of everything i've got

1758
01:01:30,870 --> 01:01:28,640
going on i think later this week i'm on

1759
01:01:32,789 --> 01:01:30,880
with the guys from you apx live on

1760
01:01:33,750 --> 01:01:32,799
instagram as well but just follow me

1761
01:01:36,230 --> 01:01:33,760
everywhere

1762
01:01:38,309 --> 01:01:36,240
and you'll find it so yeah that's it for

1763
01:01:40,309 --> 01:01:38,319
now guys uh i'm gonna love you and leave